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The Atlantic Alliance and European
Security in the 1990s
Introduction
In April 1989, when the Atlantic Alliance' ("Alliance") commemorated
its fortieth anniversary, no one could have foreseen the dramatic events
that would unfold in the subsequent months. The changes that followed
evidenced that the Alliance, formed as part of the post-World War II
United States containment policy, had fulfilled its principal purpose, i.e.,
to provide a legal basis for a security commitment between the United
States and its Atlantic allies and, thereby, to prevent the westward
expansion of Soviet power 2 and set in motion forces that would eventu-
ally topple bankrupt East Bloc communist regimes.3
For the United States, the Alliance represented a departure in for-
eign policy. Before the Alliance, the United States had foregone active
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I. The Atlantic Alliance ("Alliance") is based upon the North Atlantic Treaty
signed in Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art.
V, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
2. See generally J. GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT (1982) [hereinafter
STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT]; CONTAINMENT: CONCEPT AND POLICY (T. Deibel & J.
Gaddis eds. 1986); CONTAINMENT: DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN POLICY AND STRATEGY
(T. Etzold & J. Gaddis eds. 1978); NATO AND THE PoLIcY OF CONTAINMENT (L.
Kaplan, ed. 1968); R. OSGOOD, CONTAINMENT, SOVIET BEHAVIOR, AND GRAND STRAT-
EGY (1981).
3. It was the market economies and political pluralism of the West that exerted
such a magnetic attraction upon the politically and economically impoverished peo-
ples of Eastern Europe, leading to the revolutionary events of 1989. See generally
Childs, East Germany: Coping with Gorbachev, 88 CURRENT HIST. 385 (1989); Binder,
Grim State of East Germany's Economy is Disclosed to Parliament, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16,
1989, at A20, col. 1.
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participation in the defense of Europe, except in wartime. Initially
reluctant to join the Alliance, the United States entered into the transat-
lantic security commitment because of deepening tensions with the
Soviet Union and urging by allies, especially Great Britain.4 The Alli-
ance also formed an important part of United States foreign policy
which was designed to contain Soviet power.5 In the transformation of
American policy following World War II, the United States forged
security relationships extending from the North Atlantic to the Western
Pacific.6 Possessing an integrated command structure, the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization ("NATO") has represented an entangling alli-
ance par excellence. The Alliance has also formed a basis for deploying
forces in Europe in numbers and for a timeframe unprecedented in
American history, except during wartime. 7
NATO has been based on a conception of deterrence in which
nuclear weapons have played a crucial role. Treaty nations believed that
a formal commitment to defend Western Europe by the United States,
the sole possessor of nuclear weapons when the Alliance was founded,
would contribute to a European security equilibrium sufficient to pre-
vent war. Thus, NATO provided a guarantee of American support as a
basis for deterring the outbreak of armed conflict. Analysts argued that
such a guarantee would be preferable to the conditions that led to U.S.
military intervention in World Wars I and 11.8
Geostrategically, the Alliance was founded on the assumption that
only the United States could counterbalance the military power of the
Soviet Union.9 Just as the United States intervened in the two World
Wars to prevent the domination of Europe by powers hostile to Ameri-
can interests, so the United States saw a Europe under Soviet hegemony
as a threat to the United States itself. The Alliance, therefore, became
the cornerstone for a series of extended security commitments designed
to prevent the hostile domination of Europe and Asia.' 0 The transatlan-
tic relationship embodied in NATO forms an indispensable part of the
United States' global strategic framework constructed following World
War II with the onset of the Cold War.
Since its inception, NATO provided a security commitment in
which the United States guaranteed its allies that it would use nuclear
4. See generally Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, in AMERICAN
DEFENSE PoLicy 296 (J. Reichart & S. Sturm eds. 5th ed. 1982); D. COOK, FORGING
THE ALLIANCE: NATO 1945-1950 (1984); N. HENDERSON, THE BIRTH OF NATO(1983); NATO's ANXIous BIRTH 1-60 (N. Sherwen ed. 1985); R. OSGOOD, NATO:
THE ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 1-101 (1961).
5. See generally sources cited supra note 4.
6. See generally STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT, supra note 2.
7. See generally R. OSGOOD, supra note 4; NATO AT FORTY 64-101 (J. Golden, D.
Kaufman, A. Clark & D. Petraeus eds. 1989).
8. See generally Henrikson, supra note 4, at 303-04, 308-09; N. HENDERSON, supra
note 4 (for history of the treaty process which secured United States's commitment to
NATO).
9. See Henrikson, supra note 4, at 298, 301.
10. See generally STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT, supra note 2.
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weapons, if necessary, against a Soviet attack, even if solely launched
with conventional forces." After the outbreak of the Korean War in
June 1950, NATO acquired substantial conventional forces, but never in
sufficient numbers to mount a fully conventional defense against a
Soviet attack. 12 The experience of the Korean conflict, in which the
United States responded to the North Korean attack against South
Korea with conventional forces, led NATO to a major military buildup
and the formation of an integrated command structure, based on a for-
ward defense strategy which could only be sustained if the Federal
Republic of Germany ("FRG") contributed conventional capabilities as
a member of the Alliance.13
The Soviet Union's acquisition of a nuclear capability in the 1950s
increased the vulnerability of the United States to attack. In the context
of U.S. vulnerability, the issue became whether, and under what circum-
stances, the United States would escalate to the nuclear level. Would
any American President risk the destruction of New York or Washington
in defense of Paris or Frankfurt? The degree of uncertainty surrounding
the American commitment revealed the weakness of the transatlantic
security coupling and justified the apprehension of NATO's European
members that the United States might decouple its own security from
that of Western Europe in order to prevent its own destruction. A solid
United States commitment was, therefore, essential to the hypothetical
escalatory ladder stretching from the NATO-European battlefield to the
United States Strategic Air Command; for, it was presumed, that only
the threat of escalation would deter war in NATO-Europe, in particular
on the Central Front. 14
I. NATO's Future Role
In contrast to the first half of the century, the locus of wars since World
War II has been outside the NATO-European area. Whether NATO
contributed to this change can never be known. For two generations,
vast arsenals arrayed on both sides of the inner German border, dividing
East from West, have coexisted peacefully. The European political-mili-
tary equilibrium since World War II has contained the largest aggrega-
tion of military power in history. Such capabilities have challenged the
assertion that arms races lead inevitably to war. Despite the momentous
developments of recent months on both sides of the inner German bor-
11. See generally D. ScHWARTZ, NATO's NucLEAR DILEMMAS (1983) (on the con-
cept of extended deterrence); NucLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE (A. Pierre ed. 1984)
(also on the concept of extended deterrence).
12. See generally Hahn, Toward a New NATO Consensus, in ATLANTIC COMMUNITY IN
CRISIS (W. Hahn & R. Pfaltzgraff eds. 1979) (on the need for flexible response).
13. See generally R. McGEEHAN, THE GEAN REARMAMENT QUESTION (1971); Hen-
rikson, supra note 4, at 312-14; A. CORDESMAN, NATO's CENTRAL REGION FORCES(1988) (for current details of West Germany's military contribution to NATO).
14. See generally D. ScHWARTz, supra note 11.
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der, the vast array of military power remains largely intact.1 5 Even if
Soviet forces withdraw from Eastern Europe, substantial forces, capable
of mobilization and deployment, will remain in Europe.
Clearly, the coming era consists of uncharted waters. A new situa-
tion presenting challenges and opportunities, as well as dangers, is
replacing the predictable relationship between the two blocs. Tradition-
ally, periods characterized by profound political transformation have
contained powerful destabilizing forces.' 6 The history of Eastern
Europe, the present focus of dramatic change, alternates between peri-
ods of power domination and internal conflict. As Soviet hegemony col-
lapses, old antagonisms and conflicts resurface in forms that pose
potentially serious problems for any future European security
arrangement.
Changes that seemed virtually impossible even a few months ago
are altering the familiar East-West political landscape that emerged after
World War II in Europe. The loosening of the Soviet Union's grip in
Eastern Europe,' 7 the resurgence of nationalism in the Soviet Union,' 8
and the deepening crisis resulting from the economic failure of Soviet-
style Socialism, 19 have altered profoundly the security landscape of
NATO. Because member countries formed the Alliance in response to
the Soviet threat, the question arises as to NATO's purpose in this new
era.
In politics and in other realms, institutional structures important at
one time in history are swept aside after fulfilling their purposes or are
replaced if they fail to satisfy the needs for which they were created. To
15. See generally Davis & Pfaltzgraff, The Shifting Euro-Atlantic Military Balance-Some
Avenues of Redress, in ATLANTIC COMMUNITY IN CRISIS 91 (W. Hahn & R. Pfaltzgraff
eds. 1979); INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE 1989-1990
(1990); A. CORDESMAN, supra note 13; W. LEWIS, THE WARSAW PACT: ARMS, DOCTRINE
AND STRATEGY (1982).
16. See generally G. CRAIG & A. GEORGE, FORCE AND STATECRAFT 3-59 (1983).
17. See generally Rachwald, Soviet-East European Relations, 88 CURRENT HIsT. 369
(1989); Staar, Poland- Renewal or Stagnation?, 88 CURRENT HIST. 373 (1989); Volgyes,
Hungary: Dancing in the Shackles of the Past, 88 CURRENT HIsT. 381 (1989); Childs, supra
note 3; Ulc, Czechoslovakia: Realistic Socialism?, 88 CURRENT HIST. 389 (1989).
18. See generally, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at Al, col. 5; Clines, Azerbayjani
Front Reports Battle with Soviet Troops; Call-up of Reserves Halted, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1990, at Al, col 5; Bohlen, The Soviets and the Enmities Within, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16,
1989, § 4, at 3, col. 1; D. LIEVEN, GORBACHEV AND THE NATIONALITIES (1988);
Brzezinski, Post-Communist Nationalism, 68 FOREIGN AFt. 1 (1990); Lapidus, Gorbachev's
Nationalities Problem, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 92 (1989); Fein, Gorbachev Urges Lithuania to Stay
with Soviet Union: But Success is Doubted, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1990, at Al.
19. See generally "Z," To the Stalin Mausoleum, 119 DAEDALUS 295 (1990); E. HEW-
ETr, REFORMING THE SOVIET ECONOMY: EqUALrrY vs. EFFICIENCY (1988); P. DESAI,
THE SOVIET ECONOMY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (1987); A. AGANBEGYAN, INSIDE
PERESTROIKA: THE FUTURE OF THE SoVIET ECONOMY (1989); PERESTROIKA AND THE
ECONOMY: NEW THINKING IN SOVIET ECONOMICS (A.Jones & W. Moskoffeds. 1989);J.
SHELTON, THE COMING SOVIET CRASH (1989); A. ASLUND, GORBACHEV'S STRUGGLE
FOR ECONOMIC REFORM (1989). See, e.g., Kurtzman, Confronting the Soviet Union's Eco-
nomic Morass, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, § 3, at 6, col. 1; Fein, Soviet Official Explains
Ruble Devaluation, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
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the extent that NATO provided the security umbrella for the recovery,
subsequent prosperity and unity of Western Europe, the hopes of its
founders have been largely fulfilled. Such achievements would have
been impossible had the security needs of Western Europe not been
underwritten by the United States in the Alliance.
The successes of one era, however, contain the seeds of problems
that emerge in the future years. Similarly, failures of one period give
birth to opportunities. The devastation of World War II provided the
setting for building politically and economically advanced states in
Western Europe. The revolutionary changes sweeping Eastern Europe,
which are providing, for the first time, a basis for German unification,
will produce challenges and problems that need to be addressed in the
1990s and beyond.
Because the Alliance was founded as an indispensable element in
the security equilibrium of Europe, the question that must be addressed
concerns the nature of the balance to be maintained and the role the
United States will play in such a configuration. Because the Alliance
formed the institutional basis for an American transatlantic commit-
ment, the Alliance's utility would be lost if a U.S. commitment were no
longer needed. In assessing NATO's importance for the 1990s, the
United States and Western Europe need to achieve a consensus on this
important question. The answer will determine both the nature of the
American security relationship and the levels and types of military capa-
bilities required from the United States. If the security equilibrium of
Europe does not need a transatlantic security link, then NATO, as the
embodiment of that relationship, has amply served its purpose and can
safely be discarded. If, however, the United States must remain an
important element in the emerging security equilibrium in Europe, the
question arises as to the appropriate form of the transatlantic relation-
ship. To the extent that NATO, as the legal basis for such a transatlantic
relationship, continues to be needed, the structure of the Alliance must
be maintained and updated.
NATO's role in the emerging European security environment con-
sists of keeping the United States engaged actively in the deterrence of
conflict in Europe. Even with the prospective dissolution of the Warsaw
Pact20 and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe,2 1 a
security framework which provides for a security equilibrium will remain
20. See, e.g., Tagliabue, Moscow's New Olive Branch: Shevardnadze, in Warsaw, Sees End
to Military Alliances, Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 27, 1989, at 1; Trainor, With Reform,
Tough Times for the Warsaw Pact, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1989, at A15, col. 1; Riding,
Russians at Conference, Soviet General Sees Broad Changes in Warsaw Pact, N.Y. Times, Jan.
18, 1989, at A8, col. I [hereinafter Russians at Conference]; Riding, Hungary Seeks With-
drawal of Soviet Forces in Two Years, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1990, at A10, col. 1 [hereinaf-
ter Hungary Seeks Withdrawal].
21. See, e.g., Prague Wants Soviet Pullout by Year's End, N.Y. Times,Jan. 10, 1990, at
A1O, col. 1; Whitney, Prague andMoscow Begin Talks on Soviet Pullout, N.Y. Times, Jan.
16, 1990, at A10, col. 1; Russians at Conference, supra note 20; Hungary Seeks Withdrawal,
supra note 20.
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necessary especially as the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union undergo transformations that hold numerous dangers for
destabilization. 22 There exists in Western Europe no plausible deter-
rent to counter the regeneration and mobilization of Soviet forces other
than a United States security relationship. Regardless of the reductions
in strategic nuclear capabilities under the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty ("START"),23 the Soviet Union will possess a nuclear arsenal
capable of targeting Western Europe.
Geographically, the Soviet Union, even if several of its republics
gain autonomy, would still constitute in geographic terms the world's
largest land power. Western Europe, on the other hand, lacks the
defense-in-depth that the Soviet Union, spanning two continents, pos-
sesses. The existence of a NATO counterpoise that includes North
America provides the defense-in-depth that Western Europe lacks.
Thus, the discussion of the "dissolution of blocs" in Europe is often
marred by an absence of geostrategic considerations. The Soviet Union
is linked geographically to the European continent in which Soviet
power has been so fully deployed and which will continue to be the locus
of modernized military forces that emerge from the complex and uncer-
tain process of change now sweeping Eastern Europe. By contrast, the
United States is separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean and
becomes formally a part of the European security equilibrium only if it is
so related by a legal instrument such as the North Atlantic Treaty.24 In
22. The dangers for destabilization are inherent in the political, economic, and
military changes extant in most of Eastern Europe and to lesser degrees in the Soviet
Union. With Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe weakening, these nations are
charting new, divergent paths and, simultaneously, old nationalisms are resurgent.
Furthermore, the process of conversion from centrally-planned economies toward
free-market economies contains seeds for much domestic social turmoil as whole
nations are weaned from state control. Finally, as the Soviets begin to remove troops
from East European countries, new factors in the Central European security environ-
ment emerge. See generally Schmemann, Unification: Caution Flag, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,
1989, at A22, col. 1 (for some concerns regarding German reunification) [hereinafter
Unification: Caution Flag]; Schmemann, The Rush to One Germany Starts to Blur Europe's
Map of Alliances, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1990, § 4, at 1, col. I [hereinafter The Rush to One
Germany].
23. See generally INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, STRATEGIC SURVEY 1988-1989,
at 43-49 (1989) (on START negotiations); Bertram, U.S.-Soviet NucearArns Control, in
SIPRI YEARBoox 1989, at 359-68 (1989); Smith, A Snag In Talks On Arms, Int'l Herald
Tribune, Oct. 25, 1989; Loasby, The Learning Curve to the START Treaty, 22 INT'L DEF.
REV. 265 (1989); Manthorpe, Part 1: What Is Pushing Gorbachev Into Arms Control?, U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINGS 37 (1988); Manthorpe, Part II: What Is Pushing Gorbachev
Into Arras Control?, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINGS 73 (1989); Friedman, An Arms Obsta-
ce Falls: Moscow Puts Aside 'Star Wars'Demand, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1989, at 1, col. 6;
Obderdorfer, Baker Answers Critics of U.S. Policy, Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1989, at
Al, col. 6; Adams, STARTRatiflcation May Snag on SDI Tests, Defense News, Nov. 13,
1989, at 1; Friendly Arms Negotiators Announce Agreements, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1989, at
A10, col. 3; Rubin, STARTFinish, 76 FOREIGN POL'Y 96 (1989); Binnendijk, START: A
Preliminary Assessment, 11 WASH. Q. 5 (1988); Einhorn, The Emerging STARTAgreement,
30 SURvIvAL 387 (1988); Talbot, Why START Stopped, 67 FOREIGN AFF. 49 (1988).
24. The role of public international law and the importance of the extant state-
centric paradigm, within which international politics (e.g. geopolitics) and interna-
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this sense, the Warsaw Pact and NATO lack equivalency. The Warsaw
Pact functioned as the instrument by which the Soviet Union maintained
its hegemony in Eastern Europe. Unlike NATO, in which allied forces
have always far outnumbered those of the United States,2 5 the Warsaw
Pact has consisted, principally, of Soviet forces stationed in treaty coun-
tries without the consent of freely elected governments. 26 American
forces, on the other hand, will remain in Europe only as long as the host
countries and the United States public continue to support such a mili-
tary presence. As a voluntary association of representative governments
formed for common defense, NATO cannot be equated with the War-
saw Treaty Organization. 27 Therefore, the dissolution of Soviet hegem-
ony in Eastern Europe does not furnish a logical basis for dismantling
NATO.
II. The German Question
For the United States and its NATO-European allies, the German Ques-
tion lies at the core of the European security problem. An inevitable
consequence of the present reduction of East-West political-military
tensions has been the emergence of German unification as an issue of
growing importance.
By 1989 it had become apparent that Gorbachev was prepared to
jettison old-guard communist leaderships in Eastern Europe in favor of
tional law correlate, needs further explanation. The state-centric paradigm empha-
sizes sovereignty and is based on the foundation provided by the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, which established the legal order among states which still largely
exists to this day. Although many presuppose that codification of public interna-
tional law follows the dynamics of international politics, the two are interrelated and
influence one another. The practice of international politics is more determinative of
public international law than vice versa. When the international political situation
changes, international legal instruments, such as treaties, invariably change to codify
the new circumstances (rebus sic stantibus).
The Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) codified
the changed geopolitical order in Europe after the Napoleonic wars. Likewise, the
Treaty of Versailles (1919) codified the changed political order in Europe at the end
of World War I and created, inter alia, the League of Nations. No comprehensive
treaty, however, codified per se the new geopolitical order in Europe after Germany's
defeat in World War II, thus leaving the German question formally unanswered.
Instead, a new system of order evolved, reflecting changed political realities, such as
the assertiveness of the Soviet Union in Europe, and was subsequently codified in the
North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. These treaties must now
confront a change in political circumstances in Europe, i.e., the withering authority of
the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. A treaty codification of existing political reali-
ties that attempts to resolve the German question will probably result; again, codifi-
cation of public international law follows the dynamics of international politics.
Treaty law, thus, constitutes the most substantive source of international law (as indi-
cated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38.1.(a)).
25. See generally sources cited supra note 15.
26. See generally THE WARsAw PACr: PoL.-rxcAL PURPOSE AND MILITARY MEANS (R.
Clawson & L. Kaplan eds. 1982); W. Lwis, THE WARSAW PACr ARms, DoCTam,
AND STRATEGY (1982).
27. See sources cited supra note 26. See generally S. Dunz, UNrrED STATES MIurARY
FORCES AND INSTALIAIONS IN EUROPE 7 (1989); W. Lwis, supra note 26, at 1-6.
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reformist elements. 28 Once the certainty of Soviet military support was
removed, despite the continued stationing of Soviet forces on their terri-
tory, East European communist regimes fell like a row of dominoes.
29
What took years in the case of Poland, where the Solidarity movement
was founded a decade earlier,30 was accomplished in a matter of weeks
or days elsewhere.3 1 The crumbling of the communist regime in
Poland,3 2 together with the unwillingness of Hungary to halt the use of
its territory as a point of transit for East Germans fleeing to the West,3 3
helped precipitate the events leading to the downfall of the Honecker
Government in the German Democratic Republic ("GDR").3 4
Unlike Poland, whose nationalism is deeply rooted in history, the
East German state was the artificial creation of the postwar division of
Europe. East Germany's raison d'etre rested on the myth that it consti-
tuted the "first socialist workers' state on German territory."13 5 By 1989
its faltering economy could not maintain a population restless for the
affluence and freedom of West Germany.3 6 What followed was the
beginning of a process of German unification from below. The pace of
this change has exceeded the assimilative capabilities of both West Ger-
many and East Germany. The decision of East German authorities on
November 9, 1989, to open the Berlin Wall and other parts of the forti-
fied barrier accelerated the process of unification that began with the
exodus of East Germans through Hungary.3 7 The German Question
quickly became the most important topic of the East-West political
agenda as East Germany became essentially a dependency of West
Germany.3 8
Just as the Wall had been constructed in 1961 to stop the migration
from East Germany, which was losing a major segment of its most pro-
28. See, e.g., Gorbachev Urged Ouster of Honecker, West German Says, L.A. Times, Oct.
21, 1989, at A12, col. 1; Tuohy, Honecker Told of Needfor Reforms, L.A. Times, Oct. 8,
1989, § F, at 95, col. 1; Tuohy, Honecker Quits; East Germany May Change Course, L.A.
Times, Oct. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
29. See, e.g., Eleven Months of Peaceful Revolution, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, § 4, at 3,
col. ! [hereinafter Eleven Months of Peaceful Revolution]; Up to the Minute Scores from the
Revolution in the East Bloc, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, § 4, at 2, col. 2.
30. See generally N. ANDREWS, POLAND 1980-8 1: SOLIDARITY VERSUS THE PARTY 55
(1985); Geremek, Between Hope and Despair, 119 DAEDALUS 91 (1990).
31. See sources cited supra notes 28-29; see, e.g., Whitney, Binder, & Schmemann,
Party Coup Turned East German Tide, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 3.
32. In April 1989 Solidarity was legalized and; in ensuing elections, defeated the
Communist government; Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Solidarity official, became Prime
Minister. See generally Geremek, supra note 30 and sources cited supra note 29.
33. See generally Childs, supra note 3, at 388.
34. See generally sources cited supra notes 28-29; Whitney, Binder & Schmemann,
supra note 31.
35. See H. SPANGER, THE GDR IN EAsT-WEsT RELATIONS 6 (1989).
36. See, e.g., Schmemann, Free Travel Fails to Curb Exodus of East Germans, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
37. See, e.g., Whitney, Binder & Schmemann, supra note 31.
38. West Germany has accepted large numbers of East German emigres onto its
welfare rolls, offered lucrative grants and loans to the East German government, and
offered to subsume the nonconvertible Ost Mark into the Deutsche Mark.
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ductive population to the West,3 9 the Wall's opening in November 1989
symbolized the failure of the East German government to separate its
population from the attractions of a dynamic Western Europe and, in
particular, the Federal Republic of Germany.4 0 As events of the last
months of 1989 demonstrated, the division of Germany could continue
only as long as the GDR, backed by the Soviet Union, was prepared to
maintain the physical separation of the two states as symbolized by the
Wall.
Just as the German Question lies at the core of European security,
the issue of the form that a unified German state will take is of central
importance to the architecture of a new European equilibrium. In the
past, support for German unification in principle had been easy to state
as long as its prospect loomed only in some distant and improbable
future. It was widely assumed that the division of Europe imposed after
World War II would be sustained into an indefinite future.4 ' Past dis-
cussions concerning alternative solutions focused on three
approaches: 42 (1) a unified Germany aligned with the West as a part of
NATO; (2) a neutral nonaligned German state; and (3) improbable as it
seems, a unified German state linked in some manner with the Soviet
Union. In the FRG the political debate of the 1950s featured a discus-
sion in which West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer envisaged the
integration of the FRG into the institutions of the West, including the
European Community ("EC") and NATO, as furnishing the framework
within which German unification could, from a position of strength,
eventually be achieved.43 The Social Democratic Party ("SPD") envis-
aged then that a neutral Germany would be the price to pay for unifica-
tion, and the links between Bonn and NATO therefore served only to
delay the process of bringing the two German states together.4 The
collapse of East Germany and the apparent willingness of Gorbachev to
accept terms considered an anathema by previous Soviet leaders has vin-
39. See generally J. KELLER, GERMANY, THE WALL AND BERLIN (1964); R. SLUSSER,
THE BERLIN CRISIS OF 1961 (1973).
40. See Binder, Grim State of East Germany's Economy is Disclosed to Parliament, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1989, at A20, col. 1; Gordon, Kissinger Expects a United Germany, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1989, at A21, col. 1.
41. See generally A. DEPORTE, EUROPE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS: THE ENDURING
BALANCE 145-65 (1979).
42. See generally E. FREY, DIVISION AND DETENTE: THE GERMANIES AND THEIR ALLI-
ANCES (1987); W. GRIFFrrH, THE OSTPOLITIK OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
131-223 (1978);J. RICHARDSON, GERMANY AND THE ATLAmIC ALLIANCE: THE INTER-
ACTION OF STRATEGY AND POLITICS (1966); D. CAT Eo, THE GERMAN PROBLEM RECON-
SIDERED: GERMANY AND THE WORLD ORDER 1870 TO THE PRESENT 179-205 (1978).
43. See generally K. ADENAUER, MEMOIRS (1966); W. HANREIDER, WEST GERMAN
FOREIGN POLICY, 1949-1963 (1967).
44. See generally W. GRIFFrrH, supra note 42; D. BARK & D. GRESS, 1 & 2 A HISTORY
OF WEST GERMANY (1989). For a more recent discussion of SPD security policy, see
generally Weiller, SPD Security Policy, 30 SURVIVAL 515 (1988); Campbell, Nuremburg
and Beyond: Defining a New SPD Security Policy in SECURITY PERSPECTIVES OF THE WEST
GERMAN LEFT 40 (W. Griffith ed. 1988).
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dicated Chancellor Adenauer's vision.45
The specter that long haunted German unification, namely that
Germany and the Soviet Union would sign an agreement worked out
exclusively between them,46 will prove unfounded if Moscow accepts a
unified Germany within NATO. The relationship between Germany and
the Soviet Union is as important as the German Question to the equilib-
rium of Europe. A close alignment between the two states is incompati-
ble with a European security order based on stability. To the extent that
the intentions of a neutral unified Germany would always be suspect in
the minds of its neighbors, especially to the East,47 such a status would
hold the dangers of instability. By the same token, to the extent that the
equilibrium in Europe can be more securely based on a Western pillar of
which Germany forms a part, it follows that the future architecture, like
that of the recent past, requires that the German state which emerges
preserve as tight a link as possible with the West. Furthermore, a unified
Germany must be based upon a political system directly akin to the Basic
Law of the FRG and must have full participation in the EC and the
Atlantic Alliance.
Past discussions of German unification have foundered on the
apparent irreconcilability of neutrality and membership in the institu-
tions of the West.48 To an extent, such alternatives helped frame the
discussion of unification after the opening of the Berlin Wall. The pro-
posal put forward by then East German Premier Hans Modrow on Feb-
ruary 1, 1990, provided for a neutral Germany from which all foreign
forces would be withdrawn. 49 The government of Chancellor Helmut
Kohl quickly rejected the proposal.50 The debate in West Germany that
separates the opposition SPD and the governing CDU-FDP coalition, is
reminiscent of the debate of the 1950s, when Chancellor Adenauer con-
fronted the critics of West German NATO membership over the unifica-
tion issue. The bargaining leverage of West Germany and the West in
negotiating the terms of unification has changed, perhaps beyond
Adenauer's expectations. The West once feared a West German-Soviet
relationship in which the Soviet Union could demand, without resistance
45. See, e.g., Clines, Kohl's German Unity Plan Is 'Dangerous' Soviets Say, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 6, 1989, at A19, col 1; Excerpts from Speech by Gorbachev on Bloc, N.Y. Times, Dec.
12, 1989, at A18, col 5. See generally Yergin, Soviet-West German Relations: Finlandization
or Normalization, in SovIEr FOREIGN PoLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE 102 (G. Gin-
sburgs & A. Rubinstein eds. 1978); R. PIPES, SOVIET STRATEGY IN EUROPE (1976); T.
WoLn, SOVIET POWER AN EUROPE, 1945-1970 (1970).
46. See generally sources cited supra note 44.
47. See, e.g., Schmemann, How to Hammer Germany Back Together: The Nuts and Bolts,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1990, at A8, col. 1; Schmemann, Kohl's Political Math, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 1; Kifner, Warsaw Fightsfor Role in German Unity Talks,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1990, at A12, col. 5.
48. See generally Burley, The Once and Future German Question, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 65
(1989-90); D. CALLEo, supra note 42, at 161-78; W. HANREIDER, supra note 43.
49. Kamm, East Berlin Chief Presents His Plan to Unite Germany: Neutrality Emphasized,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1990, at Al, col 6.
50. Id
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or amendment by West Germany, that a unified Germany be neutral.51
In 1990, the West was able to refuse such terms when they were pro-
posed as an initial gambit by the East, in the expectation that more
favorable terms could be obtained.
The framers of the present transatlantic relationship and the Euro-
pean Community assumed that a peaceful European security order
required both a Western counterpoise to the Soviet Union and the inte-
gration, as fully as possible, of Germany into a Western institutional col-
laboration. Within such an architecture, the FRG became the
indispensable component of a NATO forward defense and the leading
economic power of the European Community. NATO became an insti-
tution in which the allies could develop a consensus on the level and
type of West German contribution to the common defense.52
Continuing this logic, a unified Germany should participate in a
framework designed to assure the future security equilibrium of Europe.
Whether this arrangement is possible depends, considerably, on the
unfolding political debate within Germany. The process of integrating
East Germany into a new German state will cause unpredictable conse-
quences.53 The injection of more than 16,000,000 East Germans into
the political process of a unified Germany will also create many uncer-
tainties. This problem is magnified by the fact that the last free election
on the territory of the GDR before March 18, 1990, occurred in the wan-
ing days of the Weimar Republic shortly before Hitler came to power in
1933.54 The strength of East Germany's SPD, with strong links to its
sister party in West Germany, will likely have important implications for
the unifying state. The current West German SPD holds substantially
different positions than the party of Chancellor Kohl concerning the
future roles of NATO in Europe and Germany in the Alliance.5 5 The
strength of the SPD in a unified Germany will undoubtedly affect Ger-
many's overall orientation as a part of the future Western security
framework. Should the SPD become the ruling party, Germany would
likely give increasing priority to pan-European relationships and some-
51. See generally Yergin, supra note 45; R. PIPES, supra note 45; T. WOLFE, supra
note 45; W. Giurrr=, supra note 42.
52. See generally sources cited supra note 2. See also K. ADENAUER, supra note 43.
53. Such problems might include economic recession, increasing tension
between East and West Germans (East Germans may be perceived to take jobs and
doles reserved for West Germans), tension resulting from the definition of Ger-
many's eastern border with Poland, reactions of a unified Germany's neighbors to its
unification, and frustrations of East Germans who are absorbed into West German
domestic politics without the East German representation they had in the GDR. See,
e.g., Kamm, No Undue Haste to Unity, Irate East German Urges, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21,
1990, at A10.
54. See D. CAI.Eo, supra note 42.
55. See, e.g., Markham, Saar Mayor Campains Against U.S. and NATO, Int'l Herald
Tribune, Jan. 11, 1985; Schmemann, Saar Vote Sets Stage for Challenge to Kohl, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 29, 1990, at A10; Schmemann, Bonns Social Democrats Trying to Upstage
Kohl on Reunification, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1989, at A16. See generally Weiller, supra
note 44; Campbell, supra note 44.
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what reduced emphasis to the moorings to the West that have been cen-
tral to the architecture of the past two generations.
M. German Unification and NATO
In the wake of the March 17, 1990 election in the GDR and regardless of
the outcome of future elections, the process of German unification is
proceeding at an accelerating pace. 56 The task for Germany's allies will
be to lock the emerging German state into the future security architec-
ture as fully and as soon as possible. This architecture should include
the Atlantic Alliance, in which the military forces of the FRG have been
integrated since West Germany joined NATO in 1955. 57 Numerous
questions confront the designers of such a future architecture. To the
extent that the European security equilibrium requires the participation
of a German military force, is it politically acceptable or even militarily
feasible for the force to be deployed outside of a multilateral framework
such as NATO? A Germany that was not fully a part of NATO could
hardly have its military units integrated into the Alliance structure as
they have been since the admission of the FRG in 1955. The case for
preserving German membership in NATO in order to utilize German
defense units, even at lower, residual levels is compelling.58 The alter-
native of a German military operating outside such a framework, or hav-
ing a disarmed neutral Germany, harbors potential dangers for
European security,59 at least in the minds of many in Europe and else-
where. 60 Strategic logic thus leads to the conclusion that German
56. See, e.g., Schmemann, Reunification Next?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1989, at A20,
col. 1; Protzman, Kohl to Outline Plan for German Unity, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1989, at
A14, col. 4; Protzman, Kohl Offers an Outline to Create Confederation of the Two Germanys,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Whitney, Bonn Leader Softens His Plan for
German Unity, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1989, at Al, col. 3; Unification: Caution Flag, supra
note 22; Troubled by Migration from East, Bonn Sharpens Reunification Call, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 19, 1990, at Al, col. 4; West Germans Assert Gorbachev Has Cleared Way to Reunica-
tion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1990, at Al, col. 4; The Rush to One Germany, supra note 22;
Rupnik, Central Europe or Mitteleuropa?, 119 DAEDALUs 249 (1990).
57. See generally sources cited supra note 12.
58. See, e.g., Toner, Survey Finds Americans Favor a Reunited Germany, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 1, 1989, at A21, col. 4; Friedman, U.S. Ties with West Germany Begin to Eclipse
"Special Relation" to Britain, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1989, at A32, col. 1; Friedman, Baker
Says Reunification Isn't Just a German Issue, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1989, at A16, col. 1.
59. Many Europeans and others are (rightly or wrongly) concerned about a per-
ceived, so-called national trait of militarism on the part of the Germans, especially if
German nationalism is resurgent. In addition, a disarmed, neutral Germany could
pose a temptation for future expansion by a resurgent Soviet Union. See, e.g., Binder,
East Germans React Coolly to Kohl Planfor Closer Ties, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1989, at A19,
col. 1; Whitney, Unease Fills Western Europe over Rapid Changes in East, N.Y. Times, Dec.
1, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Whitney, Rapid Change in East is Taking a Toll on the Western Allies,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1989, at A16, col. 4; Schmemann, Germany Inc.: Awesome Power
Might Be the Only Predictable Trait of a Unified Land, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, § 4, at 1.
60. See Riding, 2 Viewpoints On Germany: West Europe Divided On Whether to Cheer,
N.Y. Times, Al; Fitchett, United Germany: Scenarios for NATO, Int'l Herald Tribune,
Feb. 2, 1990, at 1; Murray, Genscher insists unified Germany stays in Nato, The Times
(London), Feb. 1, 1990; Trainer, Shift in the Western Alliance's Focus: From Moscow to a
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armed forces at levels deemed acceptable to NATO will constitute an
important part of the future European security equilibrium. Such agree-
ment would be the object of discussion within NATO, since it relates to
the sharing of defense responsibilities among its members.6 1
The question of the appropriate level of Allied forces stationed in
East Germany is closely related to that of German involvement in
NATO. As of early 1990, the Soviet Union had as many as 380,000
troops in East Germany.62 Just as the new governments of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have called for the withdrawal of all Soviet
forces from their respective territories,63 it is unlikely that a substantial
number of Soviet troops would remain in Germany except as part of a
multilateral agreement. The discussion of the future of foreign military
forces in the GDR has included possible provision for only strictly lim-
ited levels of deployment. 64 The question concerning the degree of
Unified Germany, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990; Trainer, Watching Over Germany: Focus of
NATO Shifts From Pact, Int'l Herald Tribune, Feb. 19, 1990, at 1; Cody, Across Europe,
Discreet Unease on Germany Unity, Int'l Herald Tribune, Feb. 21, 1990, at 1; Hilton, Nato
role for a united Germany, The Independent (London), Feb. 6, 1990; Fialka, Strategists
Weigh A United Germany, NATO'S Future, Wall St.J., Feb. 5, 1990; Lewis, United Germany
Urged to Be in NATO, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1990; El Pais (Madrid), Feb. 25, 1990, at 6
(Interview with Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd by R. M. de Riteurto); Der Spiegel,
Mar. 26, 1990, at 182 (Interview with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by Hans
Hielscher, Dieter Wild, and Hans Werner); Corriere Della Sera, Mar. 22, 1990, at 9
(report by Fabrizio Dragosei on the Italian Communist Party's opposition to German
integration into NATO).
On the views of Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, see Cologne Deutsch-
landfunk Networh, 1200GMT, Mar. 21, 1990, translated in Daily Report: Western Europe
(Foreign Broadcast Information Service), Mar. 22, 1990, at 4. On the views of Bel-
gian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, see Brussels Domestic Service, 1700GMT, Mar. 21,
1990, translated in Daily Report: Western Europe (Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vice), Mar. 22, 1990, at 2.
61. The issue concerning Germany's relationship with NATO is based, in large
part, on the assumption that West Germany will become the successor state of Ger-
man unification. Article 23 of West Germany's Basic Law provides for the integra-
tion of the GDR into the FRG. The FRG successor state could either remain part of
NATO, seek to amend the North Atlantic Treaty, withdraw from the Treaty, or seek
some new form of associate status in conjunction with the Treaty.
62. See, e.g., Whitney, Soviet Forces Were Ordered to Stay in Barracks, East Germans Say,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, at A31; INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUD., THE MILITARY
BALANCE 1989/90, at 38 (1989).
63. See, e.g., Prague Wants Soviet Pullout by Year's End, supra note 21; Whitney, supra
note 21, at col. 2; Russians at Conference, supra note 20; Warsaw Calls for Border Treaty
Before Germanys are Reunited, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22,. 1990, at A15, col. 5; Fowler, Soviets
Prepare Czech Departure, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990, at A12, col. 1.
However, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland recently stated that Soviet
troops should remain until the German unification issue, especially concerning
Poland's border with Germany, is resolved, although Soviet troops should ultimately
withdraw from Poland. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Polish Official Vows to Defend Border, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 1990, at A10, col. 1.
64. Before February 13, 1990, the Warsaw Treaty Organization ("WTO")
included in the negotiations on reducing Conventional Forces in Europe ("CFE") a
ceiling of 350,000 troops on all "foreign forces" deployed in central Europe, which
was defined as consisting of the Benelux countries, Luxembourg, Denmark, the FRG,
the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. By February 1, 1990, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary had requested that the Soviet Union withdraw its
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deployment in East Germany relates directly to the requirements of the
future European security equilibrium. For example, were Soviet forces
to withdraw into the Soviet Union, the West would gain increased mili-
tary warning time, thereby diminishing the prospects of a Soviet surprise
attack. In such circumstances, it would be possible for the West to
rethink its requirements for forward defense.65 Smaller units with
increased mobility and enhanced firepower capabilities could replace
the current, relatively static, "layer-cake" deployments of the national
troops from their territory. As of'July 1989, the Soviet Union had deployed 175,000
troops in the three countries in addition to the 380,000 troops deployed in East Ger-
many. The Soviet Union, however, had previously avowed to reduce the number in
East Germany to 330,000 by January 1991. Thus, in order for the USSR to meet its
commitments to reduce forces to 350,000 in central Europe, it could have withdrawn
all of its forces from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, but would not have had
to withdraw any more forces from Germany. The Soviet leadership has since
changed its views on accepting more radical cuts in the number of foreign troops
deployed in Germany because it realized that a unified Germany would not likely
tolerate the large numbers of foreign forces envisioned under the WTO proposal.
The Soviet Union thus agreed on February 13, 1990, to a U.S. proposed limit on U.S.
and Soviet forces in central Europe set at 195,000 troops. Soviet officials also
inquired at this point whether it was possible to reduce this level further, apparently
eager to see the United States withdraw most of its forces from Germany after Soviet
officials had pledged on February 11, 1990, to withdraw all of its forces from Eastern
Europe by 1995; a few months earlier, the Soviet Union had pledged to withdraw all
Soviet forces abroad by the year 2000. Soviet negotiators subsequently demanded
the complete withdrawal of all non-United States NATO forces from West Germany
at the fifth round of the CFE talks at Vienna which ended on February 22, 1990. See
generally sources cited infra note 105.
The West German government under Chancellor Kohl has asked that all Soviet
troops be withdrawn from the GDR preferably by the end of 1990. See, e.g., Fitchett,
Genscher Foresees Unity This Year: Bonn Aid Seeks Soviet Withdrawal, Int'l Herald Tribune,
Feb. 10-11, 1990, at 1. Problematically, NATO's current CFE proposal will serve to
legitimize a continued Soviet military presence in the GDR.
65. Forward defense is an integral element of NATO's flexible response strategy
and roots NATO force planning and defense strategy in the belief that it should be
capable of defending West Germany's territorial integrity, and the 30 percent of the
West German population and the 25 percent of its industry which lie within 100 km
of the intra-German border. This politically mandated objective of NATO defense
strategy demands that NATO's conventional defense posture be oriented toward the
formation of a cohesive defense line near the intra-German border. But NATO's
consistent inability to provide adequate conventional forces has raised questions
about the viability of the forward defense strategy on purely military grounds. In the
event NATO has only a short period of time in which to mobilize and deploy its
forces before the large Soviet conventional force groupings in East Germany begin to
move across the border, the forward defense strategy will not be viable, unless
NATO is prepared to use its nuclear forces. Thus, the forward defense and flexible
response strategies act synergistically in deterring Soviet aggression in Europe: the
Soviet Union, if it wished to pursue a lightning war in Europe (with little or no warn-
ing of an attack), would be faced with the high probability that NATO would use its
nuclear forces - and would not hesitate to do so first in order to defend the territory
of a NATO ally; but, if Warsaw Pact mobilization takes longer than Soviet planners
expect (Soviet military doctrine and strategy has traditionally been directed at pre-
paring to conduct a lightning war in Europe in the event of armed conflict), NATO
would have sufficient time to mobilize conventional forces adequate to conduct a
staunch defense of the intra-German border, or even launch conventional counter-
offensives into Eastern Europe.
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corps elements of NATO's front-line forces. 66
Within NATO's inherently defensive setting, the deployment
requirements for "forward-based" units would differ from those
today.6 7 The force structure that would emerge would depend on new
high technology, more extensive use of reserve forces, and in particular,
the ability to mobilize such forces in a timely fashion and to bring them
to necessary levels of readiness.
Whether such a security setting would be inherently more stable
than the balance that has deterred war in Europe for the past two gener-
ations remains to be seen. In particular, one cannot determine whether
governments would effectively utilize the warning time gained from the
changes presently sweeping Europe. In the past, reserve force mobiliza-
tion was, in itself, a potent signal of crisis escalation conveyed to an
adversary. In any event, the changing political landscape of Europe will
stimulate new approaches to defense planning, including the force
structures needed for deterrence purposes. What is important, from the
perspective of the United States and its allies in Europe, is the extent to
which a unified Germany forms a part of the Western pillar of security.
It is possible to envisage alternative models of the future security
relationship between a unified Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. Opti-
mally, from a Western perspective, Germany would retain full member-
ship in NATO, including full participation of its armed forces in the
Alliance's integrated command structure. NATO allies would decide, in
a multilateral context, whether the number of authorized active West
German forces should remain at current (495,000) or prospective
(400,000) authorized levels. 68 Similarly, NATO allies would determine
66. At the Annual Wehrkunde Conference on European Security, held on Febru-
ary 3-4, 1990, defense officials from West Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain,
Belgium, and one official from the Western European Union voiced support for the
formation of highly mobile, multinational units, under NATO command, as a
response to the withdrawal of NATO forces from West Germany. The official
stressed that the formation of such units would help link a unified Germany with
NATO's military command structure and ensure that United States troops remain in
Europe. See, e.g., Hitchens, NATO Leaders Reconsider Use of Multinational Forces, Def.
News, Feb. 12, 1990, at 9.
67. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MAWuAL 100-5, OPERATIONS (1986) (eluci-
dates current Army doctrine including the provision of more mobile forces). If
Soviet troops withdrew from Eastern Europe, NATO would benefit substantially
from the extended warning time of any future Soviet attack. Such extended warning
time would permit the redeployment of a substantial number of United States troop
elements from Europe to the United States, and likely increase reliance on reserve
troops.
68. The West German Ministry of Defense requested on October 29, 1989, the
approval of a plan to reduce the authorized peacetime strength of the Bundeswher
from 495,000 to 420,000 by 1995. On December 6, 1989, the West German Cabinet
decided to reduce the authorized peacetime strength of the Bundeswher to 400,000
by 1995, but conditioned the plan on the success of conventional arms talks between
NATO and the WTO. See, e.g., Stoltenberg to Announce Military Cuts, German Press
Agency, Dec. 6, 1989; Fisher, West German Cabinet Approves 20r,, Troop Cut, Wash. Post,
Dec. 7, 1989, at 29, col. 3; Die Bundeswher soll auf 420,000 Soldaten verhleinert werden,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 30. 1989, at 1.
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the appropriate number of active and reserve forces within the broader
framework of the requirements for overall force levels and security
structures. Were a unified Germany to retain full membership in
NATO, U.S. and other foreign forces would not necessarily be stationed
on East German territory. If they were, they would only be so deployed
in conjunction with a CFE Treaty. 69 The value of a framework that fully
integrates German forces into a NATO defense framework lies in its
multilateral decision-making process. Such a process would primarily
include Alliance members, but would also consider the broader interests
of states to the East, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia.
A second model for a unified Germany and its relationship with the
Alliance is based on the French experience. Like France, Germany
would remain a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty, but would not
participate in the integrated NATO command structure.70 Such an
arrangement, however, contains at least one shortcoming. If German
military forces are to be maintained, they could not be deployed as part
of a multilateral or integrated force that included the United States. As
in the case of France, NATO and Germany would have a defacto cooper-
ative relationship, but German military units would be organized under
German national command. An alternative within this option might be
to organize German forces around a European defense pillar based, per-
haps initially, on Franco-German collaboration. Such a defense concept
would call into question the appropriateness of France's nuclear policy
regarding a deterrent guarantee confined solely to the territory of
France. 1 In short, only if the separation of West German forces from
the NATO command structure led to their integration into a new Euro-
pean defense entity would such an approach prove satisfactory. To the
extent that such a model could be extended beyond Franco-German col-
laboration to include other West European states, the NATO command
69. See, e.g., Trainor, Shift in the Western Alliance's Focus: From Moscow to a United
Germany, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, at A20, col. 1; Fletcher, Kremlin Softens View of
German Links with NATO, The Times (London), Feb. 15, 1990, at 8, col. 7. See generally
sources cited supra note 64.
70. France withdrew from NATO's integrated military command structure in
1967, but remains in NATO's political organizations. Nonetheless, France's military
maintains liaison offices with various NATO military staffs. For details of the French
experience in NATO, see generally G. DE CARMOY, THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF
FRANCE, 1944-1968 (1970); CROZIER, DE GAULLE 521-45 (1973); HOFFMANN, DECLINE
OR RENEWAL? FRANCE SINCE THE 1930's, at 355-62 (1974); W. KULsEi, DE GAULLE
AND THE WORLD: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC (1966).
71. On the history and conceptual underpinnings of French nuclear strategy, see
generally FRENCH SECURrrY POLICY IN A DISARMING WORLD: DOMESTIC CHALLENGES
AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS (P. Le Prestre ed. 1989); R. LAIRD, FRANCE, THE
SovIET UNION, AND THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUE 45-89 (1984); D. YOST, 1 FRANCE'S
DEaRRENT POSTURE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE 29 (1984); Kemp, NUCLEAR FORCES
FOR MEDIUM POWERS: PARTS II AND III: STRATEGIC REQ.UIREMENTS AND OPTIONS(1974); F. DE ROSE, EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FRANCE (1985); P. GALLOIS, THE BAL-
ANCE OF TERROR (1961); P. Gallois, French Defense Planning, I INT'L SECURITY 20-25(1976); W. KuLs i, supra note 70; Laird, Soviet Perspectives on French Security Policy, 27
SURVIVAL 65 (1985).
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structure would need to be revised, perhaps based on the framework of
the Western European Union ("WEU"). 7 2 Such a model would give
Western Europe the defense pillar that it has lacked. The Atlantic Alli-
ance would also have to be revised to encompass a security link that
remains to be fully defined between North America and Western
Europe.
The proposal of such an arrangement for a unified Germany sug-
gests a new path toward European security. If Europe could not assume
that a unified Germany would become part of a West European security
pillar, the substitution of a national German command for the NATO
framework would probably create perceptions that would destabilize
Germany's neighbors in Europe. The French model is based upon a
national approach to defense and a continuing quest for autonomy in
military and foreign policy decision-making. 73 To the extent that the
72. The Western European Union [hereinafter WEU] includes the Benelux coun-
tries, France, West Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal. Turkey has
expressed interest in joining the WEU. The WEU traces its origins to the fifty-year
Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed at Dunkirk March 4, 1947, by Great
Britain and France, and the fifty-year Brussels Treaty signed March 17, 1948, on eco-
nomic, social, and cultural cooperation, and collective self defense between Great
Britain, France, and the Benelux countries. See generally Extracts from the Brussels Treaty,
in NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, NATO FACTS AND FIGURES 266-68 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter NATO FACTS AND FIGURES].
Initially, the purpose of both treaty alliances was to ensure European political and
military cooperation in the event of a resurgent Germany. After the Berlin blockade
in 1949, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, and the Soviet-backed
North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the focus of European defense col-
laboration shifted to the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and to the
question of how to regulate the rearmament of West Germany and Italy. The legal
status of the WEU is governed by the Paris Agreements, which were signed on Octo-
ber 23, 1954. The Paris Agreements are reprinted in Documents Relating to the Accession
To The Treaty of the Federal Republic of Germany, NATO FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note
72, at 306-34.
The issues that the Paris Agreements resolved led, in part, to the breakdown of
negotiations on the formation of a European Defense Community [hereinafter EDC].
The Paris Agreements, for example, provided that British troops would be stationed
on German soil, a move that the UK had rejected under the EDC proposal because its
forces would be controlled by a supranational entity. See infra note 80. The Paris
Agreements also invited West Germany and Italy to accede to the North Atlantic
Treaty and the WEU. The Soviet Union responded to the Paris Agreements by hav-
ing Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania sign the
Warsaw Treaty on May 14, 1954.
Despite its auspicious beginning, however, the WEU failed to become a locus for
European defense cooperation, as most of its members preferred to enhance defense
collaboration through NATO. On June 12, 1984, however, the WEU countries
agreed to reactivate the WEU in order to expand their cooperation in the develop-
ment and production of weapons systems and provide tangible proof of European
efforts to strengthen the European "pillar" of the NATO Alliance. On October 26-
27, 1984, the defense ministers of the WEU member countries published the "Rome
Declaration" announcing their decision to increase defense cooperation within the
WEU framework. In September 1988, Spain and Portugal signed protocols that pro-
vided for their entry into the WEU. See Ambassador Alfred Jean Cahen, The WEU
and the European Dimension of Common Security, DEFENCE YEARBOOK 1989, at 25-37
(London: Brassey's Defence Pub's 1989).
73. See generally sources cited supra note 70.
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French model represents, or contributes to, a revival of German nation-
alism, it would frighten Europeans who identify German nationalism
and military independence with the territorial expansion of Germany. 74
Military independence in eras past was the ultimate and pervasive sym-
bol of a destructive (and self-destructive) German nationalism that was
cast aside in the multilateral framework of which West Germany played
such a constructive part in the decades following World War II. The
French model, to the extent that it could become for Germany an end in
itself, rather than a means towards integrating Germany into a European
pillar, represents a regression in strategic thought and architectural
design.
In a third model for a unified Germany, Germany would withdraw
from NATO's integrated command structure and from the Alliance, but
retain associate status in the Alliance. Such an arrangement would
ensure Soviet agreement, but endanger the relationship between Ger-
many and the West. The United States deterrence guarantee would be
weaker with respect to an "associate" member compared to that
accorded a full member of NATO. Unless a European pillar replaced
the U.S. guarantee, Germany's security links to the West would be either
severed, or at least substantially weakened at any effective multilateral
level. An associate status would call into question even a residual U.S.
military presence in Germany. If the United States is not committed by
a mutual treaty to the defense of West Germany, then American forces
would have no plausible rationale for remaining in Germany. Under
these circumstances, any American nuclear guarantee would necessarily
be cast into doubt.
Finally, a model for German unification exists based on neutrality.
The Kohl government, however, rejected the model, which was first put
forward by the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s 75 and offered again by
then East German Premier Hans Modrow in early 1990.76 Nevertheless,
such a formulation cannot be entirely discounted as a possible outcome
of the ongoing security debate in a German political setting that
includes East Germany, whose population has long been conditioned to
view NATO in less than favorable terms. In addition, West German
opposition parties appear to support both the gradual replacement of
both the Warsaw Pact and NATO with an all-European framework such
as that alluded to in the CSCE process;7 7 together with major reductions
74. See, e.g., Pace, Scholars Say Veneer of Nonchalance Masks Wory on German Unjfica-
tion, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1989, at A2 1, col. 4; Riding, Survey Finds 2 in 3 Poles Opposed
to German Unity, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1990, at A10, col. 1.
Military independence in eras past was the ultimate and pervasive symbol of a
destructive German nationalism that was cast aside in the multilateral framework of
which West Germany became so important a constructive part in the decades follow-
ing World War II. See generally D. CAtLEo, supra note 42, at 161-177 (on post-war
German modernization).
75. See generally 1 D. BARu & D. GRxss, supra note 44, at 386-89.
76. See Kamm, supra note 49, at Al.
77. See infra notes 97 and 106.
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in German defense forces. 78 Adoption of this approach would lead
almost inevitably to fewer German security links with the West and place
Germany outside of the Western contribution to the European security
equilibrium.
IV. European Defense Collaboration and NATO
In addition to the transatlantic relationship, of which NATO is the
embodiment, providing for the legal commitment of the United States,
the architecture of a future European security framework inevitably will
feature increasing defense collaboration in Europe itself.7 9 To be sure,
the history of such efforts abounds with disappointment. The failure of
Western European governments to agree in the early 1950s on the pro-
posed European Defense Community, which would have integrated
their military forces, was symptomatic of the broader problem of build-
ing an acceptable framework for political unity.80 Defense constitutes
78. See generally sources cited supra note 44; R. PFALTZGRAFF, K. HOLMES, C. CLEM-
ENS & W. KALTEFLEITER, THE GREENS OF WEST GERMANY: ORIGINS, STRATEGIES, AND
TRANSATLANTIC IMPLCATIONS, SPECIAL REPORT (1983).
79. For the basic history and logic behind this assumption, see Howe, The Euro-
pean Pillar, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 330 (1984-85).
As NATO undergoes the transition from the trans-Atlantic alliance in which the
United States plays the leading defense role in both conventional and nuclear deter-
rence to one in which European states assume a greater share of the defense burden,
European states will seek to strengthen intra-European defense collaboration in both
conventional and nuclear deterrence. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
Treaty [hereinafter INF Treaty], signed in December 1987, provided additional
impetus for NATO European allies to undertake efforts intended to enhance defense
cooperation among themselves. The INF Treaty signalled the beginning of the with-
drawal of the United States nuclear umbrella from Western Europe and enhanced
perceptions in the West that the United States's commitment to the defense of West-
ern Europe was diminishing. As a result, some Western European allies, in particular
France, West Germany, and Great Britain, sought to compensate for the diminishing
United States military commitment to Europe by increasing defense collaboration
with other European states.
80. Initially, the EDC was proposed as a defense counterpart to a proposed Euro-
pean Political Community [hereinafter EPC], which, had it been accepted, would
have established a European body that governed political, defense, and trade issues.
The aim of the EDC would have been to establish a supranational union in Western
Europe, in which West German contingents and other European states would form a
European army under a supranational command, but integrated into the NATO mili-
tary command structure. On August 29, 1954, the French National Assembly
rejected the proposed treaty establishing the EDC, and joined Great Britain, which
had already rejected the proposal, to defeat efforts to form the EPC. As a result,
France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Great
Britain formed the WEU, which became the basis for intra-European defense cooper-
ation. On the formation of the WEU, see generally NATO FAcrs AND FIGURES, supra
note 72, at 266-68.
In October 1988, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stressed the importance
of strengthening the European pillar of the trans-Adantic alliance and reviewed the
idea of forming a European army, which would consist of the previously established
joint Franco-German brigade, and a proposed British-German brigade. NATO
European states reacted with skepticism, however, believing that the proposal could
lead to a significant reduction in United States involvement in European defense.
See, e.g., Thelen, Kohl Calls For Army of Europe, DEF. NEws, Oct. 24, 1988, at 45.
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the ultimate prerogative of national sovereignty. Had Western Europe
agreed on a defense framework, the capacity of NATO-European coun-
tries to provide for their own security would have been enhanced con-
siderably. Instead, the Alliance furnished the basis for defense
collaboration at the Euro-Atlantic level. 8 ' Without a defense pillar con-
sisting of an integrated cooperative effort by the European allies, the
On the background to the proposal of an EDC and the history of European defense
collaboration between 1945 and the early 1980s, see generally T. TAYLOR, EUROPEAN
DEFENSE: COOPERATION 15-66 (1984); H. CLEVELAND, THE ATLANTIC IDEA AND ITS
EUROPEAN RIvALS (1966); D. LERNER & R. ARON, FRANCE DEFEATS EDC (1956); E.
FURSDON, THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY: A HISTORY (1980); ATLANTIC COM-
MUNrrY IN CRIsIs 55-172 (F. Hahn & R. Pfaltzgraff eds. 1979).
81. See generally Extracts from the Brussels Treaty, supra note 72; North Atlantic Treaty,
supra note 1. Original Signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty include Belgium, Can-
ada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Great Britain and the United States. Greece and Turkey acceded to the North
Atlantic Treaty on October 22, 1951. See Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the
Accession of Greece and Turkey, Oct. 22, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, T.I.A.S. 2390, 126 U.N.T.S.
350, reprinted in NATO FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 72, at 274-75. Spain acceded
to the North Atlantic Treaty on December 10, 1981. NATO INFORMATION SERVICE,
NATO FACTS AND FIGURES 383 (1989).
The North Atlantic Treaty provides the basic legal foundation for United States-
NATO European security cooperation, and, to a limited degree, for European
defense collaboration. The Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, as modified by
the Paris Agreements, signed on October 23, 1954, provide the legal foundation for
the European "pillar" of the trans-Atlantic alliance. 6 U.S.T. 4117, T.I.A.S. No.
3428, - U.N.T.S., reprinted in NATO FACTs AND FIGURES, supra note 72, at 306-34.
In analyzing the EDC and WEU, it appears as if multilateral treaty-based security
commitments, as a customary norm of international law, become less binding on all
treaty members when any treaty member fails to take "tangible measures" in support
of its commitments. The binding nature of the commitment and the definition of
"tangible measure" should be determined in the actual text of the treaty, or in some
cases, by custom. For example, "tangible measures" as defined in the treaty, should
include whether a state has explicitly agreed to permit foreign troops to be stationed
on its soil. But, "tangible measures" also extend beyond the text of the actual treaty
to include those expectations derived from custom. For example, when foreign
troops are continuously permitted in a country, not as a matter of right under the
language of a treaty, but in order to facilitate the objectives of a mutual defense pact,
then "tangible measures" includes the custom of allowing the foreign presence.
Besides custom and express commitments in a treaty, political commitments are a
factor in determining what constitutes a "tangible measure."
Had the United States, for example, withdrawn all of its forces from Europe in
1961, at the height of the 1961 Berlin crisis, the European parties to the North Atlan-
tic Treaty would probably have considered the multilateral security commitments of
all the parties to be inoperative, or worse, that the Treaty had been abrogated. Simi-
larly, were the United States to withdraw all of its forces from Europe unilaterally in
the early 1990s, when most NATO states consider the continued presence of United
States forces in Europe to be a vital component of the United States commitment
under the North Atlantic Treaty, then NATO's European members might consider
the binding nature of the United States commitment to the defense of Europe
severely eroded, or even, that the United States had abrogated the Atlantic Treaty.
In a similar vein, the United States may consider the failure of particular European
members of NATO to meet their obligations to the common defense to have eroded
the binding strength of the U.S. security commitment under article 5 of the North
Atlantic Treaty. The United States might also consider the forced reduction of
American troops in a particular NATO-European state to have diminished the
strength of the U.S. security commitment to that state.
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contributions to NATO's integrated command structure remained on a
U.S. defense commitments in Europe are rooted in article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,
to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be ter-
minated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security.
North Atlantic Treaty, April 14, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, at 4, 34
U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
The North Atlantic Treaty does not have a termination date. According to article
13 of the Treaty, a state can withdraw from the Treaty within one year after giving
notice of its "denunciation" of the Treaty to the United States. The Agreement
Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their
Forces governs the presence of United States and allied forces on the territory of
other NATO states. June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S.
67, reprinted in NATO FAcrs AND FIGURES, supra note 72, at 276-89. See also Conven-
tion on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23,
1954, 334 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in NATO FACrs AND FIGURES, supra note 72, at 311-12.
The NATO Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Paris Agreements,
provide the legal foundation for security commitments between West European
states. The Brussels Treaty, in force until 1998, commits treaty signatories to build a
common defense system and to strengthen cultural and economic ties. The Treaty
also establishes two ministerial-level bodies: a supreme body for Western Union -
the Consultative Council - consisting of foreign ministers from treaty states; and the
Western Defense Committee, a committee subordinate to the Consultative Council,
consisting of defense ministers from treaty states.
The joint defense clause of the Brussels Treaty implies a stronger defense commit-
ment than article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 states that in the event of
an armed attack in Europe, parties to the treaty are to take "such action as it deems
necessary." The Brussels Treaty, on the other hand, requires its treaty states to pro-
vide, in the event of an armed attack, "all the military and other aid and assistance in
their power," to the party or parties so attacked. According to article IV of the Brus-
sels Treaty:
If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed
attack in Europe, the other High Contracting parties will, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the
Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.
Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense,
Mar. 17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51.
The focus of the Brussels Treaty is much wider than standard defense commit-
ments. While the Atlantic Treaty was intended, according to its preamble, to "unite"
its Parties for "collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security," the
Brussels Treaty was, according to its preamble, a "treaty for collaboration in eco-
nomic, social and cultural matters and collective self-defence. . ." Id
The Brussels Treaty, when signed in 1948, also provided a legal basis for Euro-
pean cooperation in the "event of a renewal of Germany of a policy of aggression."
Id A related protocol to the Treaty was signed on October 23, 1954, as part of the
"Paris Agreements" by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Great Brit-
ain, the FRG, and Italy. Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in
the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, T.I.A.S. No. 3428,
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national basis.8 2
How an integrated European defense would have evolved will never
be known. Conceivably, it might have led to the pooling of technologies
needed to create a European nuclear force capable of supplementing, if
not substituting for, the deterrence commitment of the United States.
Although France and Great Britain built their own nuclear forces,8 3
331 U.N.T.S. 253. Article II of the Protocol deleted from the Preamble the phrase
"to take such steps as may be necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a
policy of aggression," and replaced it with the phrase: "to promote the unity and to
encourage the progressive integration of Europe." lit Article III of the Protocol
also inserted into the Brussels Treaty a new article, article IV, which states: "In the
execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by
Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization." Id
The "Paris Agreements" include a Declaration signed by Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, France, and Great Britain, which invites the FRG and Italy to
accede to the Brussels Treaty. The "Paris Agreements" also included the signature of
a protocol on West Germany's accession to the NATO Treaty. Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, France, Great Britain, FRG, and Italy signed protocols to the
Brussels Treaty on the following subjects:
(1) Protocol revising and completing the Brussels Treaty;
(2) Protocol on the forces of the Western European Union;
(3) Protocol on the control of armaments; and,
(4) Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of
Armaments.
See NATO FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 72, at 306-34.
82. During peacetime, the armed forces of NATO allies remain under national
control. However, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACUER), who is
always a United States officer, commands some forces during peacetime. Such forces
include units and material attached to the Allied Command Europe ("ACE") Mobile
Force, air defense forces, and select quick reaction forces. All West German units
remain under NATO control even during peacetime. For information on the NATO
command structure, see D. ISBY & C. KAmPS, ARMIES OF NATO's CENTRAL FRONT
(1985).
83. On the history and conceptual framework of Great Britain's nuclear deterrent
force, see generally ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO BRITISH DEFENSE POLICY (J. Baylis
ed. 1983); J. McMAHAN, BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS: FOR AND AGAINST (1981); M.
HOLMES, BRITISH SECURITY PoLIcY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: PROSPECTS FOR THE
1990s (1987); A. PIERRE, NUCLEAR POLFTCs: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE WITH AN
INDEPENDENT STRATEGY FORCE, 1939-1970 (1972); A. GROOM, BRITISH THINKING
ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1974); Healy, A Labour Britain, NA TO and the Bomb, FOR-
EIGN AFF. 716-29 (1987); M. GOWING, I & 2 INDEPENDENCE AND DETERRENCE: BRITAIN
AND ATOMIC ENERGY 1945-1952 (1974); L. FREEDMAN, BRITAIN AND NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS (1980); S. MENAUL, CoUNTDowN: BRITAIN'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES (1980).
On the history and conceptual framework of the French nuclear deterrent force,
see generally sources cited supra note 70.
On the role of the British and French nuclear forces in a broader European and
NATO context, see generally A. BEAuFRE, NATO AND EUROPE (1966); G. GARVEY,
STRATEGY AND THE DEFENSE DILEMMA: NUCLEAR POLICIES AND ALLIANCE POLITICS
(1984); BEYOND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: NEW AIMS, NEW ARMS (J. Hoist & U. Nerlich
eds. 1977); NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE (A. Pierre ed. 1984); D. SCHWARTZ,
NATO's NUCLEAR DILEMMAS; STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE: NATO AND THE CREDI-
BILITY OF WESTERN DEFENSE IN THE 1980s (J. Wolfe, K. Rush & B. Scowcroft eds.
1982); G. TREVERTON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE (1981); G. KEMP, NUCLEAR
FORCES FOR MEDIUM POWERS (1974).
For data on the current status of British and French nuclear forces, see generally
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, STATEMENT ON THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES 1989 (1989); THE
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neither country can offer other European states a commitment based on
escalation, if necessary, to the strategic-nuclear level.84 In the 1990s,
the security setting in Europe features a growing nuclear capability
under the national controls, respectively, of Great Britain and France as
a result of the impressive strategic modernization programs in which
both are engaged. Both countries will possess an increasing number of
warheads with improved accuracy, whereas the extended deterrence
commitment of the U.S. will be receding as the number of U.S. nuclear
systems deployed in Europe and elsewhere decreases largely as a conse-
quence of the INF and START treaties.85 The future European security
equilibrium will require some type of nuclear component. 86 Most ana-
lysts also agree that conventional deterrence in the past has failed as a
basis for political-military stability in Europe.87 Europe, therefore,
INTERNATIONAL INsTrrTTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILrARY BALANCE 1989-
1990 (1989); SIPRI YEARBOOK 1989: WoRLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT 18-19,
27-32 (1989).
84. See generally sources cited supra notes 71 & 83.
85. The proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ("START") promises to lock
in, via reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, a relatively stable bal-
ance between the two countries' nuclear forces. While the result will probably
enhance the United States's ability to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, psychologically
the treaty will confirm what U.S. allies had long suspected: that the USSR's rapid
growth and modernization of strategic nuclear forces has significantly weakened the
U.S. nuclear guarantee. See sources cited supra note 23.
86. NATO first deployed nuclear forces on European soil primarily to deter a
Soviet attack utilizing overwhelmingly superior conventional forces. Currently, the
Soviet Union, while facing a highly uncertain, turbulent future, retains an over-
whelming superiority in nuclear forces relative to those deployed by NATO in
Europe. Therefore, even after considering the proposed Soviet unilateral reductions
and a START Treaty, most NATO governments believe that the United States must
retain some nuclear forces in Europe to "couple" the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent
to Europe. Without U.S. nuclear forces committed to the defense of Western
Europe, the European military equation would become highly destabilized.
Independent French and British nuclear forces could not effectively deter the large
Soviet arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear forces that will remain in Europe even
after compliance with a CFE, CFE II, START, and START II Treaties.
President Bush has stated that U.S. troops must remain in Europe "as a stabilizing
factor" even if the Soviets withdraw all their forces from Eastern Europe. Gordon,
American Troops Needed in Europe, President Asserts: Rebuffs Moscow's Plan, Restating U.S.
Position, Bush Opposes Gorbachev's Call to Make Forces Equal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1990,
at Al, col. 4.
Some Soviet officials have apparently concluded that a completely de-nudearized
world that has not first achieved "an appreciable limitation of the sovereignty of all
states ... and ... an effective international body.., capable of actually limiting the
actions of national governments in their own countries," could be highly destabi-
lizing. Polyakov, Would a Post-Nuclear World Be Stable?, MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENYA, Oct. 1988, at 121-22, translated in Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service, JPRS Report, Arms Control, Feb. 7, 1989, at 34-35. But,
neither Soviet government officials nor Soviet academics have yet drawn the logical
inference that nuclear weapons would provide a measure of military and political
stability in Europe.
87. Europe's pre-nuclear history is replete with examples of the failure of conven-
tional armies to maintain the peace. Both World Wars broke out despite some Euro-
pean politicians' belief that the potentially horrific toll exacted by modem
conventional ordnance would deter German aggression. Some people, prior to
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should focus on the appropriate type and level of nuclear capabilities
needed in a future security equilibrium in which the U.S. deployment of
nuclear capabilities on the Continent may become politically impossible.
Without U.S. nuclear deployments, the likelihood of any American con-
ventional forces remaining there will also be cast into doubt.88
With the removal of all U.S. forces - nuclear and conventional - it
will be argued that NATO, as a legal basis for an American force pres-
ence in Europe, would indeed be both obsolete and unnecessary.8 9 Nor
is it plausible to assume that if U.S. nuclear capabilities could no longer
be stationed in Europe, the United States would be prepared to extend a
nuclear guarantee that could only be fulfilled by forces launched from
off-shore platforms, including from the United States itself. Excluding
such an extreme situation, the question will remain not only what level
and type of United States nuclear and conventional presence is likely
and necessary as part of a transatlantic security coupling in the years
ahead, but also what the relationship between such forces and an emerg-
ing West European defense pillar is.
World War I, believed the power of the machine gun would be adequate to deter war.
Similarly, some nations believed prior to World War II that the concept of strategic
bombing would be adequate to deter war.
88. The United States probably will not position its troops in Europe without the
support of weapons that its political and military leadership deems necessary to
defend those troops. Therefore, it is doubtful that the United States would deploy its
own forces in Europe without some form of nuclear deterrent. Presently, there is a
broad consensus within both the U.S. government and public for maintaining a
nuclear deterrent to buttress U.S. military commitments at home and abroad.
89. Conceivably a NATO without European-based U.S. forces could remain a sta-
bilizing influence in Europe, but its credibility as a deterrent would be severely weak-
ened. The real issue here is the credibility of a state's treaty commitments. Without
U.S. forces in Europe, the United States legal commitment to defend Western
Europe would be perceived as weakened. Conversely, without NATO, no legal basis
for stationing U.S. forces in Europe would exist. NATO's continued existence is the
crucial basis for stationing U.S. troops in Europe both in peacetime and during a
crisis or conflict.
U.S. troops were originally deployed in Europe to maintain stability in the face of a
hostile and threatening Soviet Union. It is in NATO's interest, as well as in the inter-
est of the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe and even that of the Soviet
Union, to maintain a U.S. security commitment to the defense of Western Europe.
Such commitment would serve as a stabilizing influence in a region that has seen
apparently stable orders undermined by new or resurgent ambitions of one or more
powers. In the 1990s and beyond, potential sources of instability will exist in many
areas including political turbulence in the Soviet Union, potential conflicts among
Eastern European states, and the efforts of a re-unified Germany to adjust post-war
borders imposed by the United States and Soviet Union.
If all U.S. forces are withdrawn from Europe, some will argue that NATO's exist-
ence will no longer be necessary. Indeed, Soviet officials have already begun a cam-
paign to assure that NATO is dissolved. In 1989, the USSR reiterated a proposal,
first made in the 1950s, that NATO and the WTO be disbanded. The Soviet Union
also appears eager to see the CSCE become the basis for an "all-European" security
framework. But, while NATO provides the legal basis for stationing U.S. forces in
Europe, the existing CSCE formula does not provide legal justification for the U.S.
presence.
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To the extent that a unified Germany remains anchored westward,
its links in Europe necessarily will be closest with France. An evolving
Franco-German relationship within a European defense pillar could not
avoid discussion of the contribution of an indigenously-based West
European nuclear capability to the overall security equilibrium. The
French (and British) nuclear forces could not fully contribute to such a
balance if they remain restricted to deterrence solely with respect to the
national territory of their possessors. Therefore, a West European
defense pillar, as part of a European security framework, must give due
consideration to deploying British and French nuclear forces for use
beyond their respective territorial boundaries, including deterrence
over a unified Germany.
Although it has usually been relegated to the stature of a "reserve
organization," the Western European Union ("WEU"),90 which
stemmed from the Brussels Treaty of 1948,91 furnishes a potential basis
for a strengthened European defense pillar. The WEU provided the
framework for NATO to admit West Germany in 1955 by facilitating
agreement on conditions for West German armament which helped pla-
cate French fears about a possible revival of German militarism.
Recently, the WEU has attempted to revitalize itself as the strengthening
of the West European defense pillar has again become an issue.92 In the
1950s, the WEU helped Western Europe agree on the amount of Ger-
man participation in a Western defense framework; in the 1990s the
WEU may provide the structure linking a unified Germany to a West
European defense framework. The overall architecture of Europe in the
1990s includes the European Community9" with its accelerating eco-
nomic dynamism symbolized by the term "Europe 1992." 94 The WEU
might serve as a parallel institution to the EC, dedicated to the strength-
ening of the security consensus and the eventual establishment of a uni-
fied defense entity. The EC might also serve a security and defense role
if Europeans have the political will to amend and strengthen the Treaty
of Rome.95
90. See sources cited supra note 72.
91. See Extracts From The Brussels Treaty, supra note 72. The Paris Agreements,
signed on October 23, 1954, modified the commitments undertaken by the parties to
the Brussels Treaty. See supra note 81.
92. See sources cited supra note 72.
93. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, reiprinted in E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROCK, DOCUMENTS FOR EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 40-86 (1976).
94. For treatment of the full range of issues raised by the plans for economic
integration as a result of the 1992 Plan, see G. Harrison, European Community:
Issues Raised by 1992 Integration (May 31, 1989) (Congressional Research Service
Report for Congress); R. Howe, The European Community's 1992 Plan: Selected
References, 1986-1989 (Aug. 1989) (Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress); and M. Elling, The European Community: Its Structure and Develop-
ment, (Aug. 31, 1988) (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress).
95. Officials within the European Community's European Political Cooperation
Secretariat appear confident that the EC could take a leading role in arms control
policy and other European security matters. In 1989, the EC took initial steps
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Exactly how such an architecture will develop remains to be seen.
Because the core of West European stability in security and economic
terms lies in the Franco-German relationship, France is motivated to
strengthen West European collaboration, including defense, in an effort
to forestall any movement of Germany toward neutralism. French Presi-
dent Francois Mitterrand's initiative in hosting European Community
Summit meetings forms part of a strategy to place into a multilateral
European context the growing German interest in new relationships
with Eastern Europe. German interest in strengthening its relationship
with Eastern Europe will increase as the efforts toward German unifica-
tion are accelerated. 96 The strategic logic of this unfolding scene would
appear to argue for a greater effort on the part of France to build a West
European defense pillar in order to structure and balance the vast
potential of a unified Germany, both economically and politically.
V. Helsinki II and the CSCE Process
NATO, for reasons already stated, should remain a vital part of the
architecture of Europe in order to ensure that the United States contin-
ues to play a role commensurate with its own and its allies' interests. By
the same token, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) will play a vital role in the future security architecture in Europe.
A product of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, 9 7 CSCE has furnished a
framework that includes Canada and the United States in the discussion
towards expanding its role in arms control discussions by supporting a global ban on
chemical weapons and by publicly urging the rapid completion of a treaty on the
reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe ("CFE"). As of March 1990, the
EC was prepared to expand its role in the European arms control process at the 1990
CSCE summit, where the EC is expected to set forth its own arms control proposals.
Some government officials in the EC member countries believe that the EC could
serve as a coordinating group within the larger CSCE forum. U.S. officials, however,
have expressed concern that the CSCE may not be a proper forum for supporting
arms control talks because it requires unanimous decision-making by its 35 member
states before it can take action. See Hitchens & Politi, EC Eager to Play Key Role in Arms,
Security Policy, Def. News, Mar. 5, 1990, at 1, 27.
96. West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher has stated that Ger-
many should continue to take the lead in the European detente process. In particu-
lar, West Germany has led the development of cooperative structures designed to
integrate the Eastern European economies, especially the German Democratic
Republic. Germany has also provided mechanisms for cooperation with the EC and
has recently taken the lead in forming a European Development Bank and a pan-
European environmental agency. See Nahrendorf & Sottorf, Report on Interview with
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Handelsblatt (Diisseldorf), Feb. 9-10, 1990, at
6, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Western Europe,
Feb. 13, 1990, at 5-7.
This policy continues West Germany's traditional Ostpolitik. See generally C. CLEM-
ENS, RELUCTANT REALISTS: THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND WEST GERMAN OSTPOLITIK
(1989); E. FREY, DIVISION AND DETENTE: THE GERMANIES AND THEIR ALLIANCES
(1987); W. GRIFFITH, OSTPOLITIK OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY; D.
KEITHLY, BREAKTHROUGH IN THE OSTPOLITK: THE 1971 QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT
(1986); Ash, Mitteleuropa?, 119 DAEDALUS 1 (1990).
97. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 31, 1975,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ARMS ComROL: ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS 441-45 (C.
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of European security issues. The CSCE, however, does not commit the
United States to the security of Europe, and therefore should not be
seen as an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance. Rather, the CSCE, which
includes members from both East and West, functions somewhat in a
form analogous to the "Congress System," which in the nineteenth cen-
tury provided the consensual basis for European political settlement fol-
lowing periods of conflict, as in the case of the Congress of Vienna after
the protracted Napoleonic wars.98 Since these historic European con-
ferences furnished the basis for agreements that ratified boundary and
other changes that were the result of preceding conflict, the CSCE pro-
vides a natural framework within which a pan-Euroatlantic agreement on
the unification of Germany may be codified. Such an agreement would
formalize the existing boundaries, including the German-Polish border,
which are the legacy of World War H.99
During his visit to Rome on November 30, 1989, just before his
Malta meeting with President Bush, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
proposed a Helsinki II meeting100 as a follow-up to the 1975 Helsinki
Blacker & G. Duffy eds. 1984). The "Final Act" was the concluding document of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE"), held in Helsinki.
The CSCE is neither a defense treaty nor an alliance based on mutual defense
commitments. Rather, it is simply a statement of common policy that cannot substi-
tute in its present form, or in any readily forseeable form, for the North Atlantic
Treaty. The 35 states participating in the CSCE process reconvene periodically to
review progress on the implementation of the Final Act's common policy.
98. SeegenerallyJ. LOCKHART, THE PEACEMAKERS, 1814-1815 (1968); H. NIcoLSON,
THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA: A STUDY IN ALLIED UNrrY, 1812-1822 (1948).
99. Poland's current borders were fixed by the Potsdam Agreement, signed by
the major allied powers of World War II. See generally H. FRIES, BETWEEN WAR AND
PEACE: THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE (1960). At Potsdam, the Western powers codified
the postwar settlement, to which President Roosevelt had already agreed at the Yalta
Conference in February 1945. At Yalta, Roosevelt conceded to Stalin's demand that
the Polish-Soviet border be fixed at the line secured by Soviet troops in September
1939, under the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of August 1939. Roosevelt also
conceded to Stalin's demand that the Western border of Poland be established along
the Oder-Neisse river. Approximately one-third of Poland's current territory consists
of these former German territories, which remain heavily populated by ethnic
Germans. See generally W. LAFEBER, AMERICA, RUSSIA AND THE COLD WAR, 1945-1984
(2d ed. 1985); R. MESSER, THE END OF ALLIANCE: JAMES F. BYRNEs, ROOSEvELT, TRU-
MAN, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CoLD WAR (1982); S. TERRY, POLAND'S PLACE IN
EUROPE: GENERAL SIKORSKI AND THE ORIGIN OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE, 1939-1943
(1983); A. ULAM, EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE: THE HISTORY OF SOvIET FOREIGN
POLICY, 1917-1973 (2d ed. 1974); Brzezinski, The Future of Yalta, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 279
(1984/85).
100. Speech by M.S. Gorbachev at Rome City Hall (Nov. 30, 1989), reprinted in For
a Changing and Stable World, Pravda, Dec. 1, 1989, at 1, translated in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Daily Report, Western Europe, Dec. 1, 1989, at 13. When
Gorbachev made his speech, a 35-nation summit was already being considered and a
Helsinki follow-up summit meeting was scheduled for March 24, 1992. European
Community officials had also been discussing the possibility of holding the summit
earlier, perhaps in 1990, at which agreements related to a prospective CFE Treaty
might be signed.
Although the proposal for a Helsinki II summit was not unprecedented in the
Gorbachev era, its specific nature, proposed format, and agenda were unprece-
dented. Previously, in mid-July 1988, Gorbachev had proposed that a "second Rey-
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CSCE meeting. Gorbachev allegedly seeks to facilitate the emergence of
a "European realm of law" based on "existing norms of international
law" and the exclusion of "all forms of external force,"'10 and specifi-
kjavik," that is, an all-European summit, be held to accelerate arms control
discussions. See Speech by M. S. Gorbachev, Pravda, July 12, 1988, at 2, translated in
FBIS-SOV,July 12, 1988, at 40-46. In a speech before the Council of Europe onjuly
6, 1989, he also mentioned "The holding in about 18-24 months time of the second
Helsinki conference." See Moscow Television Service, 1117 GMTJuly 6, 1989, trans-
lated in FBIS-SOV, July 7, 1989, at 29-34.
The United States responded slowly to Gorbachev's Rome proposal, but did agree
with other NATO states that such a conference could be convened early if it were
well prepared and came only after a CFE Treaty had been concluded. See Binyon &
Bonart, NATO Aimsfor Role in Reshaping Europe, The Times (London), Dec. 16, 1989,
at 9, col. 1. In mid-January 1990, the EC officially endorsed the idea of an early
Helsinki II conference. See Hitchens, EC Endorses 35-Nation Summit, Def. News, Jan.
29, 1990, at 1, 40.
101. An excerpt of the most relevant passages from Gorbachev's Rome City Hall
speech follows:
Cicero said that when there is saber rattling, the laws are silent. We now
seem to be approaching a condition in which arms are silent. That means
that the laws must speak loud and dear. We are convinced that our common
desire must be a world of law, and of peace through law. It is the awareness
of this that has led to the emergence of the idea of a European realm of law: a
unified realm, but by no means a uniform one. For the law of each country
will inevitably bear the imprint of national and social specifics.
But in what area must full uniformity exist? It must exist in the understand-
ing and application by all states of the norms of international law, and here
there is much work to be done. After all, the main body of present interna-
tional law was built in the pre-nuclear age, at a time when the global
problems that have now reached a critical state were only just being engen-
dered. The actual character of the realization of international law is also
changing. For centuries it was thought - and it is still thought - that obser-
vance of its norms is ensured by compulsion. Now this is unacceptable and
dangerous. Observance of the norms of international law must be based
upon a balance of interests, and motivated by interest. That will be the main
guarantee of the effectiveness of international law when all forms of external
force excluded.
We are in favor of a changing, but stable world. This is the objective dialec-
tic of development. And the supreme responsibility of contemporary politics
with regard to mankind is to help this law of history to serve progress and the
good of the people.
Speech by M. S. Gorbachev at Rome City Hall, supra note 100, at 16-17.
Gorbachev's speech was filled with contradictions, including his reference to a
"European realm of law." On the one hand he talked about a "unified" European
realm of law, but then moved into a discussion of universal norms of international
law. What does Gorbachev mean by a European realm of law that is a "unified realm,
but by no means a uniform one"? His statements deserve further clarification by
Soviet officials. Indeed, Gorbachev proposed in his Rome City Hall speech that
thought should be given to "holding a meeting of experts from the 35 countries to
discuss the juridical aspects of the European process as part of the preparations for a
European conference - Helsinki II." M. S. Gorbachev, supra note 100, at 17.
Questions remain. Is Gorbachev soliciting Western support and understanding for
the Soviet Union's efforts to advance its own laws to meet customary international
law standards and accord with its commitments under the Helsinki Final Act? Or
does Gorbachev envision joint efforts, possibly in a multilateral forum under the aus-
pices of the CSCE, to establish new precedents and norms for customary interna-
tional law? Judging by the statements of Soviet officials before March 1, 1990, the
1990 European Security in the 1990s
cally, to strengthen the CSCE so that it can function as the European
framework for discussing East-West issues. By implication, such a
framework might eventually exclude the United States, or at least dimin-
ish United States influence over Western Europe, a long-held Soviet for-
eign policy goal.10 2 Gorbachev's architecture for Europe would also be
in conformity with the long-standing Soviet goal of replacing NATO and
the Warsaw Pact with an all-European collective security system.
In many respects, the CSCE process offers an appealing framework
on which to construct a European security system. 10 3 Because Helsinki
II contains a broad membership, including both neutral and non-aligned
states, and its mandate extends beyond purely military matters, it could
provide an appropriate forum for discussing an architecture that would
include economic, political, and military elements. The process, how-
ever, would have to include Canada and the United States and refrain
from degenerating into a factionalized propaganda forum.
The CSCE's mandate, which extends beyond purely military mat-
ters, such as defense and arms control, to address the economic and
political dimensions of European security and unity, enhances its
appeal. Clearly, as U.S. Secretary of State James Baker stressed in his
December 12, 1989, speech in Berlin, it is in the context of this broader
concept of security - encompassing economic, political and military
"legs" - that the United States and its Allies can most effectively fash-
ion a "New Europe" within a "New Adanticism."10 4 In summary, the
CSCE process provides built-in opportunities to interlink what often are
unwisely treated as separate policy realms: East-West arms control, eco-
nomic restructuring and trade relations, and political reform, including
human rights.
Public and official sentiment in Western Europe - certainly among
the "center" and "center-left," but increasingly among the "center-
right" - seems to support an accelerated CSCE process. Europeans are
attracted to the CSCE process because it appears to answer the question
with which Europeans are obsessed: "What will the future Europe look
former appears closer to the truth. Gorbachev's statements in Rome reflect the
Soviet Union's own difficulty in making the transition from a state whose leadership
was guided by the notion that law should serve only the interests of the class struggle
to a state fully integrated into the world community, whose leadership is influenced
by a "balance of interests," and more by the existing norms of customary interna-
tional law. But until Soviet officials further clarify what exactly Gorbachev meant by
developing a European "realm of law," this interesting proposal is not likely to move
forward.
102. For discussion of Soviet strategy toward Europe, see generally SovIr FOR-
EIGN POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE (G. Ginsburgs & A. Rubinstein eds. 1978); N.
MALCOLM, SOVIET POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON WESTERN EUROPE (1989); SOVIET STRAT-
EGY TowARD WESTERN EUROPE (E. Moreton & G. Segal eds. 1984); SovIr STRATEGY
IN EUROPE (R. Pipes ed. 1976); A. ULAM, supra note 99.
103. This view was expressed, for example, by SenatorJoseph R. Biden in a recent
editorial. See Biden, Helsinhi II, Road Map for Revolution, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1990, at
E21, col. 2.
104. Friedman, Europeans Praising Baker Blueprint, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1989, at
A22, col. 4.
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like?" Interest in outlining the parameters of a new European security
system has diminished the earlier West European interest in arms con-
trol via the CFE negotiations. 10 5 For a growing number of Europeans, a
missing part of the puzzle to a "New Europe" could be found in the
institutionalization of the CSCE process, including the various "stabiliz-
ing measures" now being negotiated at the Vienna talks on Confidence
and Security Building Measures ("CSBMs"). 106 The CSBM talks are, in
fact, more closely tied to the CSCE process than the CFE negotia-
tions.1 0 7 U.S. opposition to such an evolution would be counterproduc-
tive for the United States because it has just taken the first steps toward
defining a new relationship with the European Community and a new
role for NATO.
Because it functions on a much broader, political level, the CSCE
process is unwieldy and factionalized, often degenerating into a propa-
105. The negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe are being con-
ducted by the NATO and Warsaw Pact organizations in Vienna. The mandate for the
talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was to achieve a stable and verifiable
balance of conventional forces in Europe at much lower levels than exist currently.
This mandate was agreed to on January 10, 1989, following almost two years of con-
sultations among the 23 states party to the NATO and Warsaw treaties. See U.S.
INFORMATION AGENCY, To STRENGTHEN STABILITY AND SEcURFrY, CFE: NEGOTIATION
ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (1989).
The new CFE regime has its origins in NATO's Halifax Statement (May 30, 1984)
which called for "bold new steps" in conventional arms control, and in the WTO's
"Budapest Appeal" (June 11, 1986), which offered to discuss conventional force
reductions in Europe in an Atlantic-to-the-Urals ("ATTU") framework. Informal
talks between NATO and the WTO on the mandate for conventional force talks
began on February 17, 1987. OnJuly 27, 1987, NATO presented its draft mandate
for conventional force talks.
For more information on the course of the CFE negotiations, see, e.g., Adams,
Soviet Willingness to Compromise Speeds Arms Talks, Def. News, Feb. 19, 1990, at 9; Adams
& Hitchens, CFE Talks Delayed Until NATO Settles Military Maneuver Limits, Def. News,
Sept. 18, 1989, at 82; de Briganti & Hitchens, Disagreements Lurk Beneath NATO's Com-
promise Package, Def. News, Sept. 25, 1989, at 3; Def. Daily, Feb. 9, 1990, at 222;
Hitchens, CFE Session Ends With Verification Issues Lingering, Def. News, Feb. 26, 1990,
at 4; Hitchens, NATO Concessiom on Tanks, Aircraft Could Speed CFE Talks, Def. News,
Feb. 12, 1990, at 23; Gordon, A Troop-Cut Assent: Gorbachev Accepts Vital Part of Plan By
Bush to Reduce Forces in Europe, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1990, at 6; Apple, Bush Calls on
Soviets To Join In Deep Troop Cuts For Europe As Germans See Path To Unity, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 1, 1990, at Al, col. 3; Smith, Warsaw Pact Offers More Open Inspections, Wash. Post,
Oct. 20, 1989, at A36, col. 3; Gordon, Soviet Side Offers Plan to Narrow Difference on
Limiting Aircraft, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1989, at A6, col. 5.
106. The new round of negotiations on confidence and security-building measures
began on March 9, 1989, and includes the 35 states participating in CSCE. The
negotiations are intended to build upon the progress made in the negotiation of
CSBMs. See Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Sept. 19, 1986, excerpted in 29 SUR-
VIVAL 79 (Jan./Feb. 1987); Darilek, The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, A
Tale of Two Cities: Stockholm, Vienna, 29 SURVIVAL 5 (Jan./Feb. 1987).
The CSBM talks are intended to continue after and supplement the Mutual and
Balanced Force Reduction ("MBFR") talks, which ended on February 2, 1989.
107. See Darilek, supra note 106. The CSBM talks involve all 35 CSCE participating
states, whereas the CFE negotiations involve only the members of the NATO and
WTO alliances.
Vol. 23
1990 European Security in the 1990s
ganda platform.' 0 8 Recent political changes in the East may diminish
the "propaganda content" of future talks, but Soviet President
Gorbachev - in calling for a "common European home"' 0 9 in concert
with his call for a "Helsinki I" conference - clearly has a political strat-
egy that is at odds with Secretary Baker's "New Atlanticism." 0
From the U.S. perspective, then, it is important that the CSCE pro-
cess not be pursued at the expense of current intra-NATO and NATO-
EC dialogues, and that Allied efforts not be diverted from current efforts
to reach concrete results at the CFE talks. However, NATO-European
interests are strong in building on the CSCE structure, especially the
CSBM stabilizing measures, as one key component to a future European
security system. United States resistance to the CSCE could be counter-
productive, jeopardizing more important discussions now opening with
108. See Speech by George Shultz to the Thirty-Five Nation Conference on Secur-
ity and Cooperation in Europe, July 30, 1985, excerpted in 27 SURVIVAL 293 (Nov./
Dec. 1985); KAMPELMAN, THREE YEARS AT THE EAST-WEsT DIVIDE (L. Sussman ed.
1983); VON GEUSAU, UNCERTAIN DETENTE (1979).
109. See Speech by Gorbachev at Rome City Hall, supra note 100. According to
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, one of the USSR's long-range arms
control objectives is to establish "a common European and a common global home."
Statement of Edward Shevardnadze before the United Nations General Assembly,
June 15, 1988, translated in Soviet News, June 15, 1988, at 214. A recent article by
Professor Gennadiy A. Vorontsov set forth the standard Soviet approach to the
theme of building a "common European house." See Vorontsov, From Helsinki to the
'Common European House, MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA,
Sept. 1988, at 35, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, JPRS Report:
Arms ControlJan. 10, 1989, at 35.
Professor Vorontsov argues that the move toward a "common European house"
will strengthen Europe's world role, increasing its contribution to world affairs. He
also states that a growth in the independence of Europe does not mean that the West
European countries will become detached from the United States. However, he sug-
gests that to build a "common European house," it is necessary to reduce U.S. influ-
ence in Western Europe, with a concurrent growth of Soviet contacts and influence
over all of Europe. For example, he argues that the Western European states should
abrogate their political commitments with the United States regarding restrictions on
the sale of advanced technologies to the East. Also the Western European countries,
he states, should expand trade with the East European countries and the Soviet
Union, and cooperate in research and development projects. He argues that the
European states should attempt to end the U.S. "psychological warfare" that it pur-
portedly wages against the USSR by using human rights issues. Professor Vorontsov
also refers to the purportedly prevalent views among "opposition groupings" in
Western Europe that allegedly favor a Western European group of nations "maneu-
vering between the two blocs."
For a Soviet discussion of the role of the CSCE process in enhancing the "pan-
European process," see Anisimov, The Helsinki Process: Fienna Stage, 8 SLovo LEKcrORA
12 (Aug. 1989), translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, JPRS Report:
Arms Control, Nov. 13, 1989, at 40.
110. See Friedman, supra note 104. The views of French Foreign Minister Roland
Dumas and West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher on Baker's
speech are examined in Lemaitre, Title of Art, Le Monde, Dec. 16, 1989, at 5. General
European reactions to Baker's statements on the future U.S. role in Europe are
examined in Fitchett, Europeans Laud Baker Vision Of U.S. Role on the Continent, Int'l
Herald Trib., Dec. 14, 1989, at 1.
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the Allies on the future of NATO and the evolution of United States-EC
ties.
Because the CSCE structure includes the United States and Canada,
its framework takes into account important North American and transat-
lantic interests in European security and decreases the chance that the
Soviet Union might coax the Allies into a "pan-European" forum which
discards Atlanticism. Moreover, the CSCE structure provides new East
European leaders with an established forum in which to "stretch their
wings" and develop an independent voice. In addition, CSCE's "three
basket" format"' provides the West with an opportunity to link eco-
nomic assistance to the East with favorable trade agreements, political
reforms, and arms control negotiations. For example, the dissemination
11. See W. GiurFrrr, EAST-WEsT DEmNTE IN EUROPE: IN UNCERTAIN DETENTE 5,
8-13 (1987).
The final Act has three articles, or "baskets." The first establishes procedures for
the prior notification and observation of military maneuvers involving more than
25,000 troops. Article ("Basket") I includes the following statements:
The participating States recognize that there are other means by which
their common objectives can be promoted.
In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to
better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitations among their
military personnel, including visits by military delegations.
They also recognize that the experience gained by the implementation of
the provisions set forth above, together with further efforts, could lead to
developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.
Article ("Basket") II is titled "Questions relating to disarmament," and includes the
following single paragraph:
The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts
aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which
are designed to complement political detente in Europe and to strengthen
their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures
in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps
toward the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control, and which should result in
strengthening peace and security throughout the world.
Article ("Basket") III, "General considerations," states:
Having considered... subjects related to the strengthening of security in
Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting detente and disarmament,
the participating States ... will... proceed, in particular, from the following
essential considerations:
The complementary nature of the political and military aspects of
security;
The interrelation between the security of each participating State and
security in Europe as a whole and the relationship which exists, in the
broader context of world security, between security in Europe and secur-
ity in the Mediterranean area;
Respect for the security interests of all States participating in the Con-
ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe inherent in their sover-
eign equality;
The importance that participants in negotiating see to it that informa-
tion about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an
appropriate basis to other States participating in the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe and, in return, the justified interest
of any of those States in having their views considered.
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of Western technology, called for at earlier OSCE meetings,' 12 could be
conditioned on the East's agreement to democratic political protections
and Western arms control objectives.
As a means of addressing the "agenda of change," the CSCE pro-
cess has much to recommend it. But there are enough drawbacks to the
CSCE format to caution against its use as the primary framework for
channeling Europe's evolution toward a new security structure. None-
theless, the CSCE process is one set of important negotiations aimed at
defining the "New Europe" in a setting that recognizes the importance
of the transatlantic tie to European security. Hopefully, a Helsinki II
summit might also establish an atmosphere in which the new govern-
ments of Eastern Europe can be strengthened. The Vienna CSBMs,
including notification schemes, data exchanges and evaluation, and dia-
logue on military doctrine can also help stabilize Europe. The institu-
tionalization of CSCE, however, should neither replace nor take
precedence over the following equally important tasks: (1) "locking in,"
by the end of 1990, an East-West agreement on the first phase of GFE
force cuts; 1 1 (2) reaching agreement on the future role of NATO; 114
(3) clarifying the evolving nature of NATO-EC and United States-EC
ties;1 15 and (4) working with EC and NATO countries in addressing the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, supra note 97.
112. See Sharp, Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Problems and Prospects, in WORLD
ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENTs 315, 320 (1988).
113. U.S. government officials intend to pursue the completion of some form of
CFE agreement as early as possible in order to "lock in" Soviet commitments, polit-
ical or treaty-based, to reduce their forces in Europe, even if it means delaying final
agreement on key issues (such as aircraft, system definitions, verification proce-
dures). For example, the NATO draft treaty envisions a political commitment to the
destruction of over 40,000 Soviet tanks, or a Soviet commitment to a verification
regime that could serve as a precedent for future negotiations. See Hitchens, Urgency
to Sign Arms Pact May Delay Talks on Touchy Issues, Def. News, Jan. 29, 1990, at 8.
114. The communique issued by NATO foreign ministers at their December 1989
meeting stressed that the NATO Alliance must assume an increasingly political role;
that is, transform NATO into more of a political forum for contacts with the East
European states and the USSR, while de-emphasizing its military functions. France,
however, has generally been opposed to seeing NATO turned into the leading forum
for discussing Western policy options concerning change in the East Bloc, preferring
instead that the CSCE or EC become such a forum. See Binyon & Bonnart, supra note
100.
115. On the potential impact of 1992 on NATO-EC ties, see I. GAMBLES, PROS-
PECTS FOR WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY CO-OPERATION (1989); Edwards, EC 1992: Poten-
tial Implications for Arms Trade and Cooperation, Congressional Research Service, Nov. 3,
1989; and EC May Revise Defense Import Tariff Proposal, JANE'S NATO & EUROPE TODAY,
June 20, 1989, at 4, 6.
On the potential impact of 1992 on United States-EC ties, see N6Uling, The Impact of
1992 on European Integration and Relations with the United States, 23 INTERECONOMICS, Pt.
6, 255-60 (1988); W. Dekker, The American Response to Europe 1992, 3 EUR. AFF., pt. 2,
105-10 (1989); Zupnik, EC-US and 1992: A Prelude to Trade Wars?, 3 EUR. Arr., pt. 2,
111-15, 118-20 (1989); McAllister, The United States Looks at 1992, 289 EUROPE 16-17
(1989); Longworth, U.S. Begins Assessing Impact of 1992 Market Deadline: E.C. Commis-
sioner De Clerco Declares It "Good Newsfor Americans, "276 EUROPE 14-15 (1988); Yochel-
son & Hunter, 1992 Will Change the Trans-Atlantic Relationship, 285 EUROPE 14-15, 47
(1989); McAllister, U.S. Views on the EC Single Market Exercise, U.S. Department of
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question of economic relations and technology transfer with the East.1 16
Progress in these areas will provide a more stable foundation on which
to build East-West discussions concerning the larger, more political
question of "whither Europe in the 1990s."
VI. Soviet Strategy in the CSCE Process
One must view Soviet objectives with regard to CSCE within a broader
strategic context. The reformist elements of Eastern Europe were given
impetus by public statements from Gorbachev and other Soviet officials
that the Kremlin would no longer seek to impose upon Eastern Europe
any particular political, social, or economic regime; although Moscow
was reported to be instrumental in ousting the old guard communist
leaders in Eastern Europe.1 17 The economic failures of both the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe are so great that Western assistance, as well
as political and economic pluralism, represent the sine-qua-non for
domestic improvements. Gorbachev has responded by strengthening
Soviet links with existing institutions in the West, in particular, the
EC 118 and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ("GATT'),' 19
State, Current Policy No. 1193; Lamb, EC Project 1992: The Dynamics of Change, U.S.
Department of State, Current Policy No. 1132; Hitchens, U.S., Canada to Work Quietly
Against EC Common Tariff Proposal, Def. News, Sept. 18, 1989, at 57; Amouyal, Commerce
Department Wants Representation to EC, Def. News, Oct. 9, 1989, at 6.
On France's views regarding Secretary of State Baker's proposal to conclude a
treaty between the European Community and the United States, see Lemaitre, Le
Monde, Dec. 16, 1989, at 5.
116. The United States and its NATO allies have been grappling with how to liber-
alize export controls to Eastern Europe at a time when that region is experiencing
profound political change. The United States government announced on Jan. 22,
1990, that U.S. policy on export controls to Eastern Europe was under review and
would be liberalized, though to what degree remained unclear. See Silverberg, U.S.
Softens Stance on Export Controls: Measures Would Relax Trade Restrictions to Eastern Europe,
Def. News, Jan, 29, 1990, at 1, 46.
117. Gorbachev reportedly urged the long-time East German communist party
leader, Erich Honecker, to step aside during his visit to Berlin in October 1989. See
supra note 28 and sources cited therein. The Romanian regime of Nicolae Ceaucescu
was also given no support from the Soviet Union in putting down the December 1988
anti-government rebellion. Gorbachev and Prime Minister Ryzhkov all stated that
the USSR would not use force to dictate the internal policies of its Eastern European
neighbors. See supra notes 29 and 37 and sources cited therein; infra note 121 and
accompanying text.
118. Prior to 1988, Soviet officials routinely attacked the EC as the "economic arm
of NATO." Since then, they have proven eager to expand trade with the EC by
agreements concluded on a bilateral basis with the EC and multilaterally between the
EEC and CMEA. See I. GAMBLES, supra note 115, at 34.
Bilateral trade negotiations between the EC and the USSR began inJuly 1989. See
EC, Moscow begin talks on trade, JANE's NATO & EUROPE TODAY, July 25, 1989, at 7.
The EC has not expressed much interest in pursuing EC-CMEA cooperation. Never-
theless, in October 1989, it did send a single official to a conference in Moscow for
what was originally planned to be a high-level conference between CMEA and EC
officials on developing cooperation between them. See Peel, Snub for Moscow Co-Opera-
tion Talks, Financial Times, Oct. 14, 1989, at 2, col. 2.
In December 1989 Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, quoted in an interview
with the Soviet news agency TASS, predicted that current contacts between the EEC
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and by permitting the unification of Germany on terms which only
recently were unacceptable to Moscow. 1 20 The present policies of the
Soviet Union in Eastern Europe appear to be part of a strategy designed
to salvage as much influence as possible amidst collapse of economies
and political systems, whose legitimacy was based on Soviet military
might and the powerful internal security forces controlled by the com-
munist elite. 12 1
One should view Gorbachev's "common European house" within
the context of Soviet objectives in Europe. For the Soviet Union in the
1990s, Europe as a whole, and especially Western Europe, looms as an
increasingly important focus of interest. Traditionally, Soviet policy has
attempted to weaken the relationship between the United States and
Western Europe.' 22 In the past, the Soviet Union concerned itself more
with the United States than with Western Europe, but the increasing
economic and political potential of Western Europe, and in particular
and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and bilateral talks between
the EEC and individual Eastern European states and the USSR, would "go further"
and evolve into a single European "economic zone."
119. In 1986, the Soviet Union applied to participate in the Uruguay round of
trade negotiations. The United States has opposed Soviet requests to join GATT on
the grounds that the USSR is not ready to make the necessary changes in its eco-
nomic system to make it compatible with Western economies. Soviet spokesmen
have protested, however, that the USSR has at least begun to implement the neces-
sary changes. In September 1989, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy
Gerasimov stated that the Soviet government had established an inter-departmental
commission to ensure that Soviet foreign economic rules and practices comply with
GAIT standards. See Tass (Moscow), 1408GMT, Sept. 11, 1989, translated in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Soviet Union, Sept. 12, 1989, at 4; and
Tass, 1022GMT, Aug. 10, 1989, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Daily Report, Soviet Union, Aug. 10, 1989, at 5-6.
120. See Clines, World Vote Urged by Shevardnadze on German Unity, N.Y. Times, Feb.
3, 1990, at 1; see also Clines, Gorbachev Voices New reservations on German Unity: Cites His
People's Fears, Apparently Seeks to Reassure Citizens Over Former Foe - Polish Role Sought,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1990, at Al; Fletcher, Kremlin softens view of German links with
Nato, The Times (London), Feb. 15, 1990, at 8, col. 7.
121. The "doctrine of limited sovereignty," or the "Brezhnev doctrine," pur-
ported to place limits on the sovereignty of member states of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization. See, e.g., Dawisha & Valdez, Socialist Internationalism in Eastern Europe, 36
PROBs. COMMUmSM, pt. 2, at 1-14 (Mar.-Apr. 1987). The official Soviet statement
attempting to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia stated "the sovereignty of
individual socialist countries cannot be counterposed to the interests of world social-
ism and the world revolutionary movement." Id, at 1 (quoting Pravda, Sept. 28, 1968).
To enforce this new order in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership made dear, as it
had in 1956 when Soviet troops invaded Hungary, that it was prepared to use
whatever military force was necessary to ensure the unity of the Warsaw Pact and to
maintain Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. After Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to
power in March 1985, the Soviet leadership made repeated assurances to the Eastern
European states and to the West that the USSR would no longer use military force to
dictate the internal political arrangements of the Eastern European states. Subse-
quently, political leaders and populations in Eastern Europe grew bolder in their
efforts to first reform their socialist systems and then to reject the old order alto-
gether. See generally supra note 16 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 102.
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West Germany, has increased Soviet interest in Western Europe. 123
Gorbachev's "common European house" theme can be seen as an effort
to reconcile the long-standing Soviet goal of restricting United States
influence in Europe with the current policy of according Western
Europe a greater priority in Soviet global policy. Because of the formi-
dable problems in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Gorbachev
finds it necessary to enhance Moscow's links with Western Europe. In
the face of diminished hostility from Western Europe and the United
States, the Soviet Union can seek Western assistance to help reform the
decrepit economic systems that are the legacy of communist rule.
Gorbachev's task thus becomes that of building new relationships
with the West at a pace sufficiently in advance of the unfolding specter
of collapse in the East. However, the "common European house" can-
not, from Moscow's perspective, be built on crumbling communist foun-
dations; therefore, the Soviet Union has taken drastic steps resulting in
the removal of communist reformers in Eastern Europe and reorienta-
tion towards Western political and economic ideals in order to obtain
economic and other Western aid. 124 The Soviet Union has taken such
steps in order to buttress the collapsing East wing of Gorbachev's "com-
mon European house." Gorbachev must foster for the Soviet Union suf-
ficient support in the affluent West wing of the edifice in order to rebuild
and refurbish the shabby rooms in the East. Gorbachev's motivation for
seeking to strengthen the role of the CSCE process in the Europe of the
1990s is thus primarily the attainment of Western economic support for
the USSR and Eastern Europe.
VII. Adapting NATO's Role to Europe's New Strategic Realities
The strategic interest of the United States lies in establishing an active
and permanent presence in whatever "common European house" devel-
ops, for reasons deeply rooted in United States foreign policy. 125 The
United States should set priorities with respect to its interests and strate-
gies, respectively, toward NATO and the CSCE. The CSCE, however,
123. As Western Europe's stature as an independent center of political and eco-
nomic power grows, the Soviets appear to afford European nations greater stature as
independent political entities. The "common European home" theme is built
around this notion of a strong and united Europe, including the USSR. See supra note
102. In particular, the FRG is seen in the USSR as playing a crucial role in the arms
control process. See Maksimova, Revealing the Potential of Cooperation, MIROVAYA EKO-
NOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, Oct. 10, 1988, at 61-66, translated in For-
eign Broadcast Information Service, JPRS Report, Arms Control, Feb. 7, 1989, at 37-
39.
124. See supra notes 28-29, 37, and 120.
125. Exploring America's traditional ties with Europe, see, e.g., D. SMrrH, THE
GREAT DEPARTURE: THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD WAR I, 1914-1920 (1965); R.
DIVINE, SECOND CHANCE: THz TRIUMPH OF INTERNATIONALISM IN AMERICA DURING
WORLD WAR 11 (1967); K. KNORR, NATO AND AMERICAN SECURITY (1959); H. CLEvE-
LAND, NATO: THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN (1970); R. STRAUSZ-HUPEJ. DOUGHERTY
& W. KINTNER, BUILDING THE ATLANTIC WORLD (1963); NATO AFTER THIRTY YEARS
(L. Kaplan & R. Clawson eds. 1981); ATLANTIC COMMUNITY IN CRISIS, supra note 12.
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should not become, either inadvertently or consciously, a substitute for
NATO. In today's dynamic and volatile European security environment,
both critics and supporters question the continued relevance of NATO.
Both groups agree that in order to remain the pre-eminent institution
coordinating and overseeing Western security interests, NATO must
broaden its agenda, going even beyond the reforms suggested by the
Harmel Commission Report more than a generation ago, 12 6 to embrace a
more direct political role with arms control issues receiving far more
126. NATO FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 72, at 365-67 (Report of the Council,
Annex to the Final Communique of the Ministerial Meeting). The Council's report
came at a time when Gaullist views of France's role in a revived Western Europe and
West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's policy of Ostpolitik were threatening Alliance
unity and the will of the West to maintain adequate defenses. The Harmel report, so
named after the study's leader, Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel of Belgium, warned
that "the pursuit of detente must not be allowed to split the alliance." Id.
Allied leaders believed that defense and detente were not mutually exclusive poli-
cies, but rather "complementary." The Council's report stated:
The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to main-
tain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression
and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries
if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully
fulfilled this task. But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as
the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German ques-
tion, remain unsolved. Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty
still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces. Under these condi-
tions, the Allies will maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to
assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security
and confidence.
In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the
search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underly-
ing political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of detente are
not contradictory but complementary. Collective defense is a stabilising fac-
tor in world politics .... The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in
particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of dtente.
The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a
settlement of the political problems in Europe.
ME at 365-66.
The Council emphasized the need for stronger political unity and more political
consultation within the Alliance. The NATO ministers were also careful to amelio-
rate French concerns about the role of the United States in the alliance, which French
officials felt was too great, and so agreed to the inclusion of the following passage in
the report:
As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies
to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing
house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each of the Allies can
decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems and objec-
tives of the others. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations
needs to be deepened and improved. Each Ally should play its full part in
promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of detente must not
be allowed to split the alliance. The chances of success will clearly be great-
est if the Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of dose con-
cern to them all; their actions will thus be all the more effective.
Id. at 366.
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serious attention in the unfolding East-West dialogue. 127 As the only
forum in which all major allies have a voice, NATO could, and in fact
should, play a central role in building a new European security
structure.
As part of the process of institutional change and evolution, NATO
more actively could manage the arms control regime that emerges in the
1990s and thereby play an important role in any future European secur-
ity network. Currently, Alliance officials suggest that NATO should log-
ically, at least for the West, be placed in charge of arms control
verification.128 Some officials also suggest that the elaborate force plan-
ning review procedures recently established by NATO could provide the
infrastructure for a joint, inter-allied arms reduction coordination pro-
cess. If NATO does not assume greater responsibility, the prospects of
harmonizing the disparate force reduction and restructuring efforts
likely to be adopted by individual Alliance members will be slim indeed.
It is far from dear whether the NATO allies will be able to imple-
ment agreed reductions in a coordinated manner. Factors such as
domestic political pressure, budget constraints, environmental con-
cerns, unfavorable demographic trends, and the growing inclination to
take cuts in national force levels even before they are formally agreed
upon, in other words defacto disarmament, 129 may in fact complicate a
reasoned, collective effort to reorganize Western defenses in the wake of
a conventional arms control agreement with the East.
The CFE negotiations, 130 begun in early 1989, provide a promising
127. Legal considerations are indeed relevant to any discussion of institutional
change with respect to NATO. The recent proposal by Secretary of State Baker
addresses the issue of an enhanced role for NATO. To the extent that NATO goes
beyond defense issues, the North Atlantic Treaty may need to be amended, even
though the existing treaty possesses great flexibility and has always provided a frame-
work for political endeavors. Article 2 of the Atlantic Treaty, for example, broadens
the scope of the treaty in theory, although it has not done so in practice. The North
Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, at 321.
128. The NATO foreign ministers have accepted and endorsed Secretary of State
Baker's proposal, made in Berlin, to create a NATO Arms Control Verification Staff.
See NATO Charting New Role, Int'l Herald Trib., Dec. 16-17, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
129. The government of the United Kingdom recently indicated that a review of
British defense requirements was underway, and that political and military changes in
Europe may lead to unilateral reductions. See Kemp, UK Considering Force Cuts, JANE's
DEF. WEEKLY, Feb. 17, 1990, at 286. France's defense posture is also likely to be
affected. See UN Effort de Defense Face a une Situation Mouvante, Le Monde, Nov. 28,
1989, at 14. The U.S. defense budget, submitted by President Bush to Congress for
fiscal year 1991, proposes extensive cuts in the U.S. force structure. See Fennegan,
Cheney Chided for Timid Cuts to Weapon Systems, Def. News, Feb. 12, 1990, at 42, 44.
The Benelux countries have begun plans to withdraw their forces from West Ger-
many irrespective of whether a CFE Treaty is signed. In lateJanuary 1990, the Dutch
government announced that it was going to begin withdrawing its forces stationed in
West Germany. See Dutch upset Nato by troop cuts in Germany, The Independent
(London), Jan. 27, 1990, at 13, col. 4. Belgium has announced that it had recently
begun planning for the withdrawal of its forces deployed in West Germany. See
Belium Plans to Withdraw its NATO Units in Germany, Int'l Herald Trib., Jan. 20, 1990,
at 1, col. 2.
130. See supra note 105.
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basis for reductions in the most menacing categories of conventional
armaments. 13' The CFE began auspiciously as both NATO and the
Warsaw Pact put forward proposals that narrowed substantial gaps in
their approaches to European security and arms control.'8 2 For NATO,
the CFE represented an advance over previous negotiations, in particu-
lar the protracted but inconclusive Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-
tion ("MBFR") talks,'88 since the CFE talks focused on the territory
between the Atlantic and the Urals and therefore included the European
territory of the Soviet Union. An agreement covering such territory
could contribute potentially to increasing warning time of a Soviet attack
and reducing the advantages of geographic depth available to the Soviet
Union but not to NATO. Furthermore, the CFE provides for asymmet-
rical reductions of military capabilities to levels that would be equal for
NATO and the Warsaw Pact.'3 Such an approach has great value for
the West because it eliminates the substantial numerical advantage pos-
sessed by the Soviet Union. In addition, a CFE treaty would come in the
wake of an INF Treaty,35  which eliminated from the U.S. and Soviet
arsenals surface-to-surface nuclear systems with ranges between 500-
5500 kilometers.' 8 6 Because Western nuclear systems are the ultimate
hedge against Soviet conventional advantages, further negotiations at
131. The most menacing weapons include tanks, artillery, armored personnel car-
riers, combat aircraft, and helicopters. These weapons are menacing because a
Soviet surprise attack would depend on them for its initial success. See J. GARRET,
THE TENUOUS BALANCE: CoNvENIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE (1989); J.
DOUGLAsS, SovimE MIrTARY STRATEGY IN EUROPE (1980); J. ERICKSON, L. HANSEN &
W. SCHNEIDER, SoviE" GROUND FORCES: AN OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT (1986); P.
VIGOR, SovrET BLITZKRIEG THEORY (1983); Galvin, Some Thoughts on ConventionalArms
Control, 31 SURVIVAL 99, 102-05 (1989).
132. See supra note 105.
133. See RECORD, FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE: STARTING OVER, (1980); Sharp,
supra note 112, at 315-46; Canby, Mutual Force Reductions: A Military Perspective, INT'L
SECURITY, Winter 1978, at 122-35.
134. See CUTrING CONvENTIONAL FORCES I: AN ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICIAL MAN-
DATE, STATISTICS, AND PROPOSALS IN THE NATO-WTO TALKS ON REDUCING CONVEN-
TIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (1989). See also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
135. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics on the elimination of their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Mis-
siles, Dec. 8, 1987, in Selected Documents, No. 25, Department of State Publication
9555 (1987) [hereinafter The INF Treaty], reprinted in SIPRI YEARBOOK 1988: WORLD
ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENTS, 395-406 (1988).
The INF Treaty, the first arms control agreement directly affecting U.S. forces in
Europe, was not concluded on a multilateral basis involving NATO allies. The
Treaty, therefore, sets a precedent, perhaps a dangerous one, for the withdrawal of
U.S. forces outside of the NATO framework.
136. Id Article I of the INF Treaty states that each Party shall eliminate those
weapons systems possessed by either state which can be termed "intermediate-range
missile" or "shorter-range missile" systems within the definitions provided in article
II of the Treaty. Id. Article II, paragraph 5 of the Treaty defines an "intermediate-
range missile" as "a GLBM [ground-launched ballistic missile] or a GLCM [ground-
launched cruise missile] having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but
not in excess of 5500 kilometers." Id Article II, paragraph 6 of the Treaty, defines a
"shorter-range missile" as "a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or
in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers." ld
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the nuclear level, with specific reference to Europe, have been post-
poned until a treaty having conceptually the features of CFE can be
agreed upon and implemented.1 7 Because of its importance in reduc-
ing Soviet conventional advantages, the CFE was properly embraced as
a substantial advance in arms control design and as a logical step in the
arms control dimension of East-West security.
To the extent that we find ourselves in the midst of profound polit-
ical change in Europe, most of which was unforeseeable when the CFE
negotiations began, the question arises as to whether or not unfolding
political events have made such arms control negotiations moot. The
level of Soviet capability under the CFE exceeds the level that newly
elected governments in Eastern Europe would permit.388 More impor-
tantly, since the United States, its NATO-European allies, and the gov-
ernments of states such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary wish to see the
Soviet Union remove all military personnel and equipment from Eastern
Europe, the CFE must not now be permitted to legitimize the presence
of Soviet forces in countries where they are neither desired nor needed.
Equally important is the need, recognized by the Bush Administra-
tion, to break any perceived link between the Soviet force presence in
Europe and the number of United States personnel stationed in Europe.
This concern was the essence of President Bush's proposal in January
1990 for a mutual United States-Soviet force limit of 195,000 Soviet and
U.S. troops in the Central Region Zone'8 9 as discussed in the CFE talks,
while allowing for an additional 30,000 U.S. troops deployed in Europe
but outside the Central European Zone. 140 At the February 1990,
Ottawa meeting of the NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, both
sides accepted the Bush proposal for troop deployments. 14 1
Paradoxically, the changes in Eastern Europe have made the role of
arms control less decisive in shaping a future European security struc-
ture. The commitment of a government to arms control negotiations
often helps secure support for modernization programs designed to
strengthen negotiating positions. This occurred, for example, when
NATO decided to develop and deploy intermediate nuclear forces
137. NATO's deployment of U.S. nuclear weaponry in Europe stemmed from fear
that the Warsaw Pact countries' conventional force advantage was otherwise insur-
mountable. REcolin, supra note 133, at 6-8. The conventional forces imbalance in
Europe, favoring the Warsaw Pact, continued to grow through the late 1980s and was
the central factor behind NATO's planning for the deployment and continued mod-
ernization of its nuclear forces. The proposed elimination of the Warsaw Pact's con-
ventional advantages under the terms of the various CFE proposals would eliminate
an important, but not the sole, rationale for the deployment of NATO nuclear forces.
Therefore, the United States and some of its NATO allies pressed to postpone talks
on the reduction or elimination of short-range nuclear forces in Europe until after a
CFE agreement had been concluded.
138. See supra notes 64 and 105 and accompanying text.
139. This area includes the territories of the two Germanies, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
140. A Troop-Cut Assent, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1990, at 6, col. 5.
141. Soviet Willingness to Compromise Speeds Arms Talks, Def. News, Feb. 19, 1990, at 9.
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("INF") to offset Soviet SS-20 missile deployments. 142 As with the INF
Treaty, arms control agreements may be said to reflect the balance of
military power at a particular time, and lock-in that balance by restrict-
ing the ability of the signatories to augment specified military capabili-
ties. The value of arms control agreements is seen to be greatest at
moments of heightened political tension between states. If arms control
agreements in themselves do not diminish existing political differences,
they nevertheless may contribute to an atmosphere in which conflicts
and tensions are more easily ameliorated and in which further armament
reductions become feasible.
When negotiations for a CFE agreement were initiated in 1989,
there was evidence from Gorbachev's earlier statements, notably his
address to the United Nations on December 7, 1988,143 that the Soviet
Union was prepared to decrease unilaterally its force structure in East-
ern Europe. 44 CFE would have codified reductions extending beyond
Gorbachev's proposals. Subsequent events in Eastern Europe which
have led Eastern European states to call for withdrawal of Soviet forces
from their respective territories, and the prospective unification of Ger-
many, have altered the initial underlying premises of the CFE.
When arms control was most needed, in the days of deepest polit-
ical tension between East and West, arms control could not be attained.
Today, when arms control seems readily attainable, many view CFE as
superfluous.' 45 Yet the need to preserve CFE as the forum for regulat-
ing and coordinating Allied and Soviet-Warsaw Pact force cuts remains.
The rapidly changing European security environment needs an agree-
ment, such as the CFE framework could provide, to codify the with-
drawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and establish a framework
142. The initial request for NATO nuclear modernization came from European
leaders concerned about the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 theater-strategic range
missile, which some Western European government officials feared would have the
effect of "decoupling" the U.S. nuclear deterrent from Europe. SeeJ. Davis, Theater-
Nuclear Force Modernization and NATO's Flexible Response Strategy, 457 ANNALS AM. AcAD.
POL. & SOC. SCL (Sept. 1981), at 78-87.
143. Statements on Conventional Arms Control. Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at the UN
General Assembly, Dec. 7, 1988, 31 SuRvivAL 171, 171-76 (1989).
144. Id In this speech, Gorbachev pledged:
By agreement with our Warsaw Treaty allies, we have decided to withdraw
from the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary by
1991 six tank divisions, and disband them. In addition, landing-assault and
some other units, including landing-assault units with their armaments and
combat material, will be withdrawn from Soviet forces stationed in these
countries. The Soviet forces stationed in these countries will be reduced by
50,000 men and 5,000 tanks. The Soviet divisions which still remain on the
territory of our allies will be restructured, a large number of tanks will be
withdrawn, and they will be withdrawn, and they will become strictly defen-
sive.
Id.
145. See A Quickening Pace on Arms, Boston Globe, Feb. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 5; Dean,
Negotiated Force Cuts in Europe: Overtaken by Events?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan. 1990,
at 12; see also Why Wait for CFE? Dixon Wants U.S. Troops Out Now, Defense News, Feb.
12, 1990, at 8 (Interview with Senator Alan Dixon).
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in order to regulate force levels from the Atlantic to the Urals. 146 The
CFE is not a guarantee of a continued United States presence in Europe.
Implicit in any European troop reductions regime is the understanding
that American forces will remain in Europe only so long as they are
authorized to do so by the elected governments of the states in which
they are stationed, and as long as the U.S. Congress continues to sup-
port their forward deployment.
Conceptually, the case for a residual U.S. force presence in Europe
rests on the geographic reality of the Soviet Union's European presence.
It is in the best interest of the United States, its allies, and the future
European security equilibrium to establish limits on Soviet forces sta-
tioned west of the Urals. It is especially important that such an agree-
ment provide for an acceptable level of U.S. forces to be stationed in
Europe as part of the transatlantic security link. Finally, the CFE can
play an important role in setting an orderly phasing process for reduc-
ing and establishing procedures for assuring compliance with arms con-
trol agreements.
In sum, CFE should be viewed, in keeping with a major function of
arms control agreements, as codifying a changing set of political-military
relationships and setting forth agreed measures for verification that will
be complex, calling for aerial surveillance on the basis of the "Open
Skies" initiative as well as on-site inspection. OFE will impose on the
West verification requirements beyond those with which the intelligence
community would otherwise be tasked. Therefore, crucial to any CFE
Treaty will be the extent and effectiveness of a verification regime based
on the necessary level of intrusiveness. Ultimately, the success or failure
of the GFE, as with any arms control endeavor, lies in the extent to
which the signatories are prepared to contribute to its success.
Conclusion
Although there are numerous continuities, especially of a geostrategic
nature, between the era in which the Alliance was founded and the
1990s, the Europe of the 1990s will be increasingly powerful both in a
political and economic sense. Nevertheless, despite the steps that are
likely to be registered toward greater unity, especially in the EC and
perhaps in the political realm as well, the United States will continue to
play an indispensable role in the evolving security equilibrium.
Although the leverage available to the United States will diminish, the
enduring strategic interests of the U.S. dictate its continuing engage-
ment in shaping a transatlantic partnership. For the dynamic European
political setting, the challenge will be to create a security order which
builds on the achievements of the past two generations. Its ingredients
include, first and foremost, the links between North America and a
Europe within which a unifying (or unified) Germany is fully integrated.
146. CFE or some version of the 23-nation negotiation, rather than the 35-nation
format of the CSGE, should provide the framework.
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Such are the essential requirements for a European security framework
that will safeguard the interests of the United States and other nations in
the 1990s and beyond.

